




















This work would not have been possible without the support of many people within MIT and beyond. I would like to thank my wonderful wife, Kate, for her support and encouragement over the past two years. Thank  you  to  Professor  John  Heywood  for  his  guidance  and  mentorship  in conducting and reporting this research. Thank you to all of my fellow group members, past and present, whose work I have relied on for my own research, and who have helped me along by asking the right questions  and  giving  honest  feedback.  Thanks  to  Lynette  Cheah,  Irene  Berry,  and Valerie Karplus, for editing sections of this thesis; and especially to Jeff McAulay for providing such useful feedback on the whole thing. This  research  was  supported  through  the  William  Asbjornsen  Albert  Memorial Fellowship, and by CONCAWE, Shell Hydrogen LLC, and Eni S.p.A. 
 6 
  7 
Table of Contents 
1  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 9 
1.1  Technology, Fuel Consumption, and Other Attributes ..............................................9 
1.2  Trends in Vehicle Technology and Attributes ........................................................... 12 
1.3  A Technology Allocation Framework ........................................................................... 17 
1.4  Thesis Overview .................................................................................................................. 19 1.4.1  Scope of Work ................................................................................................................................ 20 1.4.2  Some Notes on Conventions .................................................................................................... 21 
2  Incentives Linking Performance and Fuel Consumption..................................23 
2.1  Incentive Structures ........................................................................................................... 23 
2.2  Incentives Targeting Fuel Consumption ..................................................................... 25 2.2.1  Direct Incentives on Fuel Consumption.............................................................................. 25 2.2.2  Greenhouse Gas Incentives ...................................................................................................... 27 
2.3  Incentives Targeting Performance................................................................................ 30 2.3.1  Engine Displacement Incentives ............................................................................................ 30 2.3.2  Engine Power Incentives........................................................................................................... 31 
2.4  Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 32 
3  Development of a Technology Allocation Model .................................................33 
3.1  Modeling Purpose and Principles.................................................................................. 33 
3.2  Model Structure ................................................................................................................... 35 3.2.1  Value of New Technologies ...................................................................................................... 36 3.2.2  Constraints on Technological Feasibility ........................................................................... 37 3.2.3  Optimizing Technology Allocation ........................................................................................ 37 
3.3  Model Inputs & Assumptions .......................................................................................... 38 3.3.1  Relationship between Acceleration and Power/Weight Ratio ................................. 38 3.3.2  The Acceleration ‐ Fuel Consumption Tradeoff............................................................... 43 3.3.3  Willingness to Pay for Fuel Consumption Improvements .......................................... 46 3.3.4  Willingness to Pay for Performance ..................................................................................... 49 
3.4  Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 53 
4  Calibration of Baseline Scenario ...............................................................................55 




4.4  Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 65 
5  Evaluation of Policies to Influence Performance and Fuel Consumption ...67 
5.1  Fuel Price ............................................................................................................................... 67 5.1.1  Modeled Response to Fuel Price Changes.......................................................................... 67 5.1.2  Comparison of Results with European ERFC.................................................................... 69 5.1.3  Comparison of Results with Elasticity‐based Calculations......................................... 74 5.1.4  Effect of Fuel Price on Consumers’ Value of Technology ............................................ 76 
5.2  Incentives to Influence ERFC ........................................................................................... 79 5.2.1  Modeling of Incentives ............................................................................................................... 79 5.2.2  Fuel Consumption Incentives.................................................................................................. 81 5.2.3  Acceleration (Dis‐)Incentives.................................................................................................. 84 
5.3  Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards.............................................. 86 
5.4  Technology Development and Deployment Incentives.......................................... 90 












The challenges posed by petroleum dependence and greenhouse gas emissions are tightly interlinked with the transportation sector, and especially with cars and light‐duty trucks, in the United States. The U.S. transportation sector relied on petroleum for 95% of its energy requirements in 2007, while accounting for nearly 70% of U.S. petroleum  demand.  The majority  of  this  demand  is  for  gasoline  to  fuel  light‐duty vehicles  (cars  and  light  trucks).  Gasoline,  consumed  almost  entirely  by  light‐duty automobiles,  accounted  for  approximately  two‐thirds  of  transportation  energy demand,  or  45%  of  total  U.S.  petroleum  demand.  (Energy  Information Administration,  ;  Federal  Highway  Administration,  2008)  Furthermore,  the combustion of petroleum by cars and light trucks accounted for nearly 20% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2007. (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2009) 
1.1 Technology, Fuel Consumption, and Other Attributes The  development  and  adoption  of  efficiency‐enhancing  technologies  holds  the promise of significantly reducing petroleum demand and greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles in the future. Fuel consumption (typically expressed in liters per 100km),  along  with  distance  traveled  and  fuel  type,  is  a  primary  determinant  of petroleum  demand  and  emissions  from  vehicles.  (Bandivadekar  et  al.,  2008) Technologies are expected to be deployed over the next 25 years that could reduce the fuel consumption of new automobiles, while maintaining current levels of size, performance, and safety. New technologies  include both  incremental,  evolutionary refinements of vehicles with naturally‐aspirated,  spark‐ignition engines,  and more radical technologies such as turbocharging and hybridization that can deliver more of  a  step‐change  improvement  in  efficiency.  (Bandivadekar  et  al.,  2008;  National Research  Council  (U.S.).  Committee  on  the  Effectiveness  and  Impact  of  Corporate Average  Fuel  Economy  Standards,  National  Research  Council  (U.S.).  Board  on Energy  and  Environmental  Systems,  &  National  Research  Council  (U.S.). Transportation Research Board, 2002) 
 10 
The introduction of efficiency‐enhancing technologies does not ensure that vehicle fuel  consumption  will  be  reduced,  because  of  the  inherent  tradeoff  between  fuel consumption  and  other  vehicle  attributes.  The  inclusion  of  more  advanced technologies  in  new  vehicle  designs  can  either  be  applied  to  reducing  fuel consumption, or to offsetting the effects of other design changes that would tend to increase  fuel  consumption.  (Cheah,  Bandivadekar,  Bodek,  Kasseris,  &  Heywood, 2008)  The  latter  include  increases  in  size  or  power,  the  addition  of  power accessories,  or  of  features  that  add  weight,  such  as  soundproofing  or  safety equipment.  (An  &  DeCicco,  2007)  More  generally,  any  given  vehicle  can  be redesigned to have lower fuel consumption by trading off other attributes, such as size and performance,  even  if no new efficiency  technologies are added.  Similarly, performance  and  size  can  be  improved  without  adding  new  technology,  though doing so will come at the expense of fuel consumption (or some other attribute). The  tradeoff  between  competing  vehicle  attributes  is  illustrated  conceptually  in Figure 1‐1  for  the case of vehicle acceleration and  fuel consumption. For a certain baseline level of technological capability, there exists a feasible range of acceleration and  fuel  consumption  characteristics,  represented  by  Region  I.  Although  any combination of  acceleration  times  and  fuel  consumption  values within Region  I  is feasible, only those combinations that fall on the curve between Region I and Region II are said to be technically efficient. Thus, the optimal allocation of technology will always  fall  along  this  curve.  (Wetzstein, 2005) The  tradeoff between performance and  fuel consumption can  therefore be  thought of as moving back and  forth along this “frontier” of design possibilities. 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Figure 1­1: Range of  feasible  combinations  of  acceleration  and  fuel  consumption  expands with improved technology. Based on Cheah et al. (2008). As  technology  improves  over  time,  the  range  of  possibilities  expands,  enabling manufacturers  to  improve  acceleration  or  fuel  consumption  performance without sacrificing other attributes. The range of possibilities enabled by the new technology is  represented  in  Figure  1‐1  by  Region  II.  New  efficiency  technologies  added  to vehicles  will  generally  reduce  the  vehicle’s  fuel  consumption  or  enhance  its performance,  and  some  may  do  both.  For  example,  substituting  a  lighter‐weight material into a vehicle while keeping everything else the same will both reduce the vehicle’s  fuel  consumption and  increase  its power/weight  ratio  (reducing  its 0‐60 mph time). An engineering team making such a technology improvement might then downsize the engine to restore power/weight to its original level, while realizing a further  improvement  in  fuel  consumption. Or,  they might  elect  to  increase  engine power,  delivering  an  additional  boost  to  performance,  while  returning  fuel consumption  to  its  initial  level.  (Cheah  et  al.,  2008)  Thus,  even  with  “win‐win” technologies that improve both performance and fuel consumption, design changes 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can  be  used  to  effectively  convert  improved  performance  into  better  fuel consumption, or vice versa.  Cheah  et  al.  (2008)  introduced  a  parameter  called  emphasis  on  reducing  fuel 
consumption  (ERFC)  to  quantify  the  degree  to  which  improvements  in  vehicle efficiency  are  realized  as  reductions  in  fuel  consumption.  ERFC  is  defined  as  the ratio of  the reduction  in  fuel consumption realized over some time  interval,  to  the reduction  that  would  have  been  possible  if  all  other  vehicle  attributes were  held constant.  This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1‐1,  for  the  simplified  case  in  which  only performance  is  traded  off  against  fuel  consumption.  Starting  from  initial  fuel consumption and acceleration values defined by point  ‘A’, moving horizontally  left to point ‘B’ is defined as an ERFC of 100%, since acceleration is held constant and all of  the  new  technology  introduced  is  dedicated  to  reducing  fuel  consumption. Moving vertically down to point ‘C’, on the other hand, corresponds to 0% ERFC. For a general point ‘D’, the ERFC is given by the following equation: 
Equation 1­1 
             
Although  ERFC  values  between  0‐100%  are  of  the  greatest  interest  in  this  work, ERFC  is  not  limited  to  this  range.  Negative  values  of  ERFC  are  possible,  if  fuel consumption  actually  increases  over  time.  Similarly,  values  of  ERFC  greater  than 100% are possible if some other attribute is given up to decrease fuel consumption. For example, if acceleration times increase above their initial level, then ERFC may exceed 100%. 
1.2 Trends in Vehicle Technology and Attributes The  technical  efficiency  of  new  vehicles,  and  the  corresponding  range  of  design possibilities,  has  increased  steadily  over  time  since  at  least  the  1970s.  (An  & DeCicco,  2007; U.S.  EPA,  2008) An  and DeCicco  (2007) developed  a performance‐size‐fuel economy index (PSFI) to “capture important aspects of the energy‐related 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services  that  automobiles  provide,”  and  to  help  quantify  the  overall  rate  of improvement in technical efficiency. They defined PSFI for cars as the product of the power/weight ratio, size (interior volume), and fuel economy: 
Equation 1­2 
    
An  and  DeCicco  found  that  PSFI  increased  linearly  from  1977  through  2005, reflecting steady improvements in the technical efficiency of new vehicles, as shown for cars in Figure 1‐2. (An & DeCicco, 2007) 
 
Figure 1­2: Average Performance‐Size‐Fuel Economy  Index  (PSFI)  of  new U.S.  cars,  1977‐2008. (An & DeCicco, 2007; U.S. EPA, 2008) Historically, the steady growth in technical efficiency of U.S. cars has not translated into  steady  reductions  in  fuel  consumption.  Instead,  cars  in  the  U.S.  have  seen substantial  increases  in  performance  and  little  improvement  in  fuel  consumption. Figure 1‐3 shows how the constituent factors of PSFI have changed since 1977. Fuel economy increased rapidly through the mid‐1980s, when fuel prices were high and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards were being ramped up, but has remained  relatively  flat  since  then.  (Energy  Information  Administration,  2009; 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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2004) The average power/weight ratio  declined  slightly,  then  began  an  upward  trend  that  has  continued  through 2008.  The  size  of  the  average  car,  as measured  by  interior  volume,  has  remained relatively  constant.  These  trends  indicate  that  offsetting  continually  increasing performance  has  been  the  primary  application  of  more  advanced  technologies introduced  into  new  U.S.  cars  over  the  past  25  years.  For  this  reason,  the  work reported  here  focuses  primarily  on  the  tradeoff  between  performance  and  fuel consumption in future vehicles.  
 
Figure  1­3:  Average  performance,  size,  and  fuel  economy  of  new  U.S.  cars,  1977‐2008. Values are indexed to 1977 averages. (U.S. EPA, 2008) The emphasis on reducing fuel consumption (ERFC) for new U.S. cars has been low for most of the past 20 years. Cheah et al. (2008) calculated an ERFC of 8% for the average  new  car  between  1995  and  2006.  However,  the  precise  value  of  ERFC  is sensitive to year to year fluctuations in fuel consumption and other attributes, so it is instructive to calculate ERFC values for many different time intervals. Figure 1‐4 shows  the  ERFC  values  calculated  for  each  year  since  1982,  applying  the methodology of Cheah et al.  (2008).  In each year,  the ERFC  is  calculated based on 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the  change  in  attributes  over  the  preceding  5  years.1  In  the  early  1980s,  ERFC exceeded  100%,  reflecting  the  decline  in  performance  (and  size)  since  the  late 1970s, as shown in Figure 1‐3. ERFC waned through the 1980s as gasoline prices fell and Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards stabilized (Figure 1‐5, Figure 1‐6), bottoming  out  at  ‐13%  in  1992.  ERFC  varied  between  approximately  0  and  20% through 2003, then jumped as gasoline prices again rose.  
 
Figure 1­4: Historic  emphasis  on  reducing  fuel  consumption  (ERFC)  for  average  new U.S. car.  For  each  year,  ERFC  was  calculated  based  on  the  change  in  fuel  consumption  and performance‐size‐fuel economy index (PSFI) over the preceding 5 years. (Cheah et al., 2008; U.S. EPA, 2008) In  the present work,  the period  from 1991  to 2003  is of particular  interest.   Both gasoline  prices  and  CAFE  standards  in  the  U.S.  were  relatively  stable  during  this period, and  for  the 5 years prior.  (Figure 1‐5, Figure 1‐6) Therefore,  it  is useful  to examine trends during this period to elucidate consumers’ valuation of performance and fuel consumption, undistorted by regulations or volatile fuel prices. 
                                                        
1 For example,  the ERFC reported  for 2008  is based on the change  in attributes between 2003 and 2008. 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Figure  1­5:  Gasoline  price,  U.S.  city  average  retail  price  (including  taxes),  all  grades  and formulations. (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008; Energy Information Administration, 2009)  
 
Figure  1­6:  Corporate  Average  Fuel  Economy  (CAFE)  standards  for  new  U.S.  cars,  1978‐2007. (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2004) 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1.3 A Technology Allocation Framework In order for more advanced technologies to contribute to reductions in automotive petroleum demand and greenhouse gas emissions, the efficiency enhancements they deliver  must  be  converted  into  actual  reductions  in  fuel  consumption.  Previous work  at  MIT  has  shown  that  directing  evolutionary  technology  improvements  to lowering  fuel  consumption  can  reduce  fuel  demand  and  emissions  by  amounts comparable to those offered by more radical advanced technology vehicles, a  least through  2035.2  The  likelihood  of  these  evolutionary  technologies  entering  the market  over  the next 25 years  is  high,  so  they  represent  a  safe bet  for  improving vehicle efficiency. (Bandivadekar et al., 2008) However, as shown in the preceding section, new efficiency‐enhancing  technologies have not been directed  to reducing the fuel consumption of U.S. cars recently. In other words, emphasis on reducing fuel consumption  (ERFC) will  need  to  increase above historic  levels  in order  for  these expected improvements to be realized as reductions in fuel consumption. Therefore, an  understanding  of  how  the  auto  industry  allocates more  advanced  technologies among  fuel  consumption  and  competing  attributes  would  be  invaluable  for policymakers interested in reducing fuel consumption. Many  analyses  of  future  fuel  consumption  potential  and  related  policies  overlook the inherent tradeoff between performance and fuel consumption, and the issue of allocating  technologies  among  competing  attributes.  They  instead  adopt what  can be  called  a  technology  adoption  framework.  Under  a  technology  adoption framework, a certain set of individual technologies is assumed to be available over a particular  timeframe,  and  vehicle  performance  and  other  attributes  are  fixed  at  a pre‐determined level. Manufacturers are assumed to adopt only those technologies that are cost‐effective under the given policy environment, while leaving others “on the  shelf.”  (Greene,  Patterson,  Singh,  &  Li,  2005;  National  Highway  Traffic  Safety 
                                                        
2  Advanced  technology  vehicles  here  include  hybrids,  plug‐in  hybrids,  clean  diesels,  and turbocharged spark‐ignition vehicles. 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Administration,  2008;  National  Research  Council  (U.S.).  Committee  on  the Effectiveness  and  Impact  of  Corporate  Average  Fuel  Economy  Standards  et  al., 2002) The  rate of  technological  evolution predicted by  these  technology  adoption models  varies  widely,  depending  on  the  assumed  price  of  fuel  and  relevant government policies. The  technology  adoption  framework  employed  in  many  analyses  may  be unrepresentative  of  the  automotive  system  for  several  reasons.  First,  the  wide variability  that  they suggest  for  technology adoption rates  is  inconsistent with  the finding  of  An  and  DeCicco  that  overall  technical  efficiency  has  improved  quite steadily over the past 30 years, even as design priorities have swung back and forth between performance  and  fuel  consumption.  (An & DeCicco,  2007)  Second,  in  the near to medium term, manufacturers are subject to practical limits on their ability to incorporate more advanced technologies  into vehicle designs. (Klier & Linn, 2008) Finally, automotive product planners work in an environment of limited capital, and generally  make  tradeoffs  in  which  they  forego  improvements  in  one  attribute  in order  to  fund  improvements  in  another  attribute,  while  maintaining  “budget discipline.” (Hill, Edwards, & Szakaly, 2007) In this work, a technology allocation  framework is used to explore the relationship between automotive performance and fuel consumption. The historically stable rate of  technological  improvement,  limitations  on  readily  available  technology,  and tradeoff‐based design process suggest that this framework may be better suited to modeling technology decisions related to automotive fuel consumption. In contrast to  the  standard  technology  adoption  framework,  the  technology  allocation framework  used  here  assumes  that  the  degree  of  adoption  of  more  advanced technologies is fixed over a given time interval, and seeks to understand how those technologies will be allocated  to  the competing attributes of performance and  fuel consumption.  Rather  than  asking  “how  much  technology  will  be  adopted?”  the technology  allocation  framework  asks  “how  will  particular  attributes  change  as technology is introduced?” 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Other authors have implied the value of using a technology allocation framework to evaluate future technology decisions. Evans (2008) noted that technology adoption models “may, to some extent, overlook the complex trade‐offs manufacturers must make  against  vehicle  attributes  within  a  constrained  budget,”  and  that “manufacturers may  still  prefer  to  direct  technologies  to  improve  the  power  and size  of  vehicles,”  if  those  attributes  are  more  valuable  than  reductions  in  fuel consumption.  An  and  DeCicco  (2007)  point  out  that  “Given  a  certain  state  of technological capability, exactly what technologies are used and how they are used are  defined  within  a  constrained  product  development  budget.”  Like  Evans,  they acknowledge  that  “numerous  economic  trade‐offs  occur  in  the  context  of  product planning,” and recommend  future work  investigating  “what conditions are needed for technical efficiency gains to be allocated for meeting policy objectives.” 
1.4 Thesis Overview The work  reported  in  this  thesis  seeks  to  improve upon  the understanding of  the performance  ‐  fuel  consumption  tradeoff  by  introducing  a  technology  allocation perspective  to  the  modeling  of  manufacturers’  technology  decisions.  Such understanding  can  provide  guidance  to  policymakers  interested  in  increasing  the emphasis  on  reducing  fuel  consumption  as  more  advanced  technologies  are introduced into the fleet. It was hypothesized that,  
In  the  absence  of  policy  intervention,  emphasis  on  reducing  fuel 
consumption will remain near zero in the United States, and technology 
improvements  will  be  directed  overwhelmingly  toward  increasing 
performance. The work also aims to provide an assessment of the structures and stringencies of policies that can most effectively stimulate an increase in ERFC, while maintaining a robust  automotive manufacturing  industry.  Chapter  2  examines  the  stringency  of some  key  government  policies  in  Europe  and  the  U.S.  that  directly  influence  the tradeoff  between  performance  and  fuel  consumption,  and  compares  them  on  a common  basis.  Chapter  3  documents  the  development  of  a  technology  allocation modeling  framework,  including  the  approach  used,  rationale,  key  equations,  and 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assumptions.  Chapter  4  establishes  a  baseline  scenario  for  future  technology allocation  to performance and  fuel  consumption,  calibrated against historic  trends in  performance  and  fuel  consumption.  In  Chapter  5,  the  technology  allocation response  to changes  in  fuel price and a variety of government policies  is explored using  the  model,  and  the  implications  for  consumers’  value  of  more  advanced technologies  are  evaluated.  Chapter  6  presents  some  conclusions  drawn  from  the work  and  discusses  opportunities  to  expand  and  improve  upon  this  work  in  the future. 




excludes  consideration  of  other  attributes  that  are  certainly  related  to  fuel consumption,  such as vehicle size. As shown  in Section 1.2, performance has been the  major  beneficiary  of  recent  improvements  in  the  technical  efficiency  of  cars. Stemming the growth in vehicle performance may offer the greatest opportunity for increasing emphasis on reducing fuel consumption, so performance was chosen as the attribute to be traded off against fuel consumption in this work. 
1.4.2 Some Notes on Conventions Throughout  this  thesis,  unless  otherwise  noted,  all  dollar  figures  are  quoted  in constant  2007  dollars,  and  were  adjusted  from  their  nominal  values  using  the consumer  price  index  for  all  urban  consumer  consumers.  (Bureau  of  Labor Statistics, 2008) Except as noted,  fuel economy and  fuel  consumption values represent unadjusted, laboratory test values, as measured by a 55/45 weighted average of the city (FTP) and  highway  fuel  economy  tests.  These  figures  are  the  same  ones  used  for determining  compliance  with  Corporate  Average  Fuel  Economy  standards.  (49 U.S.C. 32904(c) ) Power  and  weight  feature  prominently  in  discussions  of  vehicle  performance throughout  this  work.  Unless  noted  otherwise,  power  refers  to  the  engine  peak horsepower,  and  weight  refers  to  the  vehicle’s  inertia  weight  (equal  to  its  curb weight plus 300 pounds). These conventions are consistent with those used by An and DeCicco (2007) and Cheah et al. (2008). 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2 Incentives Linking Performance and Fuel Consumption 
There is a broad variety of policies that can influence the tradeoff between vehicle performance and  fuel  consumption. These policies can come  in  form of  standards, taxes, or rebates; they can be applied at the time of purchase or may recur over the life of the vehicle; and they may target fuel consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, engine power, or any of a variety of other attributes. (Evans, 2008) Evans provides a useful  introduction  to  these  policies,  discusses  their  relative  strengths  and weaknesses, and compares the stringencies of several systems of standards and fuel taxes  employed  in  various  countries.  He  stops  short,  however,  of  calculating  the incentive rates, i.e. the marginal cost or benefit that incentive‐based systems impose directly on fuel consumption or related attributes. Because the present work focuses on the relationship between consumers’ value of vehicle attributes and the optimal allocation of  technologies,  incentive  systems  that place a price directly on  specific attributes are of particular interest. Therefore, this chapter examines the stringency of  some  of  the major  incentive‐type  policies  that  are  employed  in  the  U.S.  and  in selected  European  countries,  and  estimates  the  equivalent  stringency  of  certain European  policies  if  they  were  applied  to  the  U.S.  car  market.  These  values  will provide a useful context for the modeling of incentive effects, presented in Chapter 5. First, however, a brief overview is provided of the structure of incentive systems and related nomenclature. 
2.1 Incentive Structures Incentive  systems  can  be  penalty‐based,  reward‐based,  or  a  mix  of  the  two.  A penalty‐based system would be one that imposes some penalty, such as a tax or fee, on vehicles depending on some attribute of  interest. A reward‐based system takes the  opposite  approach,  providing  a  subsidy  or  other  benefit  to  vehicles  that  are deemed to have desirable attributes. Also possible is a mixed system of rewards and penalties,  commonly  known  as  a  feebate  system.  Regardless  of  whether  they  are 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reward‐based, penalty‐based, or mixed, incentives systems can be defined by three key characteristics. (Evans, 2008)  The first defining characteristic of an incentive system is the attribute on which it is based.  The  present  work  is  concerned  with  the  performance‐fuel  consumption tradeoff,  and  so  considers  incentive  systems  based  on  fuel  consumption  and  on attributes related to acceleration. The second key feature of an incentive system is its rate, which defines the amount of  penalty  charged  or  reward  offered  for  a  given  unit  change  in  an  attribute.  Put another way, the rate is the derivative of the incentive amount with respect to the attribute of  interest.  In  the case of a  fuel consumption  incentive program,  the rate would  be  expressed  in  dollars  per  unit  change  in  fuel  consumption.  The  simplest rate  structure  for  an  incentive  system  is  to  have  a  constant  rate,  whereby  the incentive amount is  linearly proportional to the change in the attribute of  interest. (Greene et  al.,  2005)  Importantly,  a  constant  rate  is  also a  condition  for achieving the  largest  fuel  consumption  response  at  the  least  cost.  According  to  the equimarginal  principle,  total  costs  are  minimized  and  economic  efficiency  is achieved  when  marginal  costs  are  equal  across  all  vehicles  and  manufacturers. (Field, 1994) Therefore, a uniform rate should be a central principle of any incentive system if economic efficiency is desired. The  third  key  feature  of  an  incentive  program  is  its  pivot  point,  which  is  the attribute level at which the incentive amount is zero. This is most relevant for mixed (feebate)  type  incentive  systems,  wherein  the  pivot  point  is  the  level  of  fuel consumption  above  which  a  fee  is  charged  and  below  which  a  rebate  is  offered. (Evans,  2008) However,  a  penalty‐based  system  can  be  thought  of  as  a  system  in which the pivot point is below the lowest fuel consumption level on the market, and a  reward‐based  system  can  be  thought  of  as  a  system  in which  the  pivot  point  is higher  than  the highest  fuel  consumption  rate on  the market. The  selection of  the pivot  point  determines  whether  the  incentive  system  will  be  a  net  collector  of 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revenue  for  the government, will  incur net  costs, or will be made revenue‐neutral (i.e. the total fees collected equal the total rebates paid out).  
2.2 Incentives Targeting Fuel Consumption The  first  type of  incentives  considered here  is  the  type  that places a price on  fuel consumption  (or  fuel  economy).  In  the  United  States,  federal  policies  do  this directly.  In many European  countries,  there are policies  that do  this  indirectly,  by creating incentives based on greenhouse gas emissions. (Evans, 2008) 
2.2.1 Direct Incentives on Fuel Consumption Two  major  federal  policies  define  incentive  rates  for  fuel  consumption  of  new vehicles  in  the United  States:  Corporate  Average  Fuel  Economy  (CAFE)  standards and the gas guzzler tax. (Evans, 2008) Although CAFE is a standards‐based program, it  imposes civil penalties on auto manufacturers whose average fuel economy falls short  of  the  required  standard.  These  penalties  increase  with  the  fuel  economy shortfall,  and  therefore  impose  a  marginal  cost  on  higher  fuel  consumption.  The amount  of  the  penalty  for  new  car  fleets  in  2009  is  shown  in  Figure  2‐1.  The marginal cost of higher  fuel consumption (i.e.  the slope of  the curve)  for car  fleets that  just miss  the  standard  (8.6  l/100km or 27.5 mpg)  is  approximately $180 per car for each 1l/100km by which they miss the standard.4 However, the penalty only applies  to  vehicle  fleets  that  fail  to  meet  the  applicable  standard,  so  there  is  no policy incentive for manufacturers to continue to decrease fuel consumption below the level mandated by the CAFE standard. 
                                                        
4 Because the penalty is based on fuel economy rather than fuel consumption, the marginal penalty rate decreases as fuel consumption rises. This is reflected by the concave shape of the curve in Figure 2‐1.  The marginal  penalty would  decrease  to  less  than  $100  per  (1l/100km)  for  a  fleet  averaging more than 11.4 l/100km (less than 20.6 mpg). 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2.2.2 Greenhouse Gas Incentives Several European countries have created incentive programs for fuel consumption, in effect, by basing vehicle tax rates on CO2 emissions. Policies targeting greenhouse gas emissions are closely related to those targeting fuel consumption, because CO2 is the  primary  greenhouse  gas  emitted  during  automobile  operation,  and  is proportional  to  the  amount  of  fuel  used.  (An  &  Sauer,  2004)  In  2008,  France introduced a “bonus‐malus” feebate system that is based on tailpipe CO2 emissions, as shown in Figure 2‐3. (ACEA, 2008) Other than the very large bonus for vehicles emitting less than 60 g/km, the system offers an average incentive rate of €18 per 1g/km  reduction  in  tailpipe  CO2  emissions,  as  illustrated  by  the  dashed  line. However, because the bonus‐malus system classifies vehicles into large bins, it will deliver  large  benefits  for  some  reductions  and  no  benefits  for  other  reductions, depending  on  the  initial  emissions  level  and  the  amount  of  reduction.  Thus,  the average  incentive  rate  is  offered  as  a  broad measure  of  stringency  rather  than  a precise estimate of the benefit of reducing emissions in a particular vehicle. France 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also  charges  an  annual  ownership  tax  on  cars  owned by  businesses, which  varies from  €2  to  €19  per  (g  CO2/km).  The  tax  is  progressive,  with  higher‐emitting vehicles being subject to the higher per‐gram rates. (ACEA, 2008) 
 
Figure  2­3:  Taxes  and  bonuses  offered  on  first  registration  of  new  vehicles  in  France  in 2009,  based  on  tailpipe  CO2  emissions  as  measured  on  the  New  European  Drive  Cycle (NEDC). (ACEA, 2008) Other European countries, too, have created incentives for lower fuel consumption through  CO2‐based  vehicle  taxes  on  vehicles.  (ACEA,  2008)  Several  of  these  are summarized  in  Table  2‐1,  for  both  vehicle  acquisition  and  ownership.  Like  the French bonus‐malus system, many of these systems make use of emissions bins, so the incremental incentive amount for changing emissions in a particular vehicle may not accurately reflect the overall stringency estimates shown in Table 2‐1. Although Portugal  has  some  extremely  high  rates,  it  employs  a  progressive,  marginal  tax system, in which the tax rate increases as the emissions level increases. As a result, the higher  rates  are  charged only on  the  emissions  in  the highest brackets  (much like income taxes in the U.S.). 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Table  2­1:  CO2‐based  acquisition  and  ownership  tax  rates  for  gasoline‐fueled  cars  in selected European countries. Also shown  is  the equivalent  stringency of  the European CO2 policies if applied to U.S. cars. European policies are expressed in terms of the New European Drive Cycle, and U.S. equivalents are based on the unadjusted CAFE cycle. Assumes 8,800 g CO2  per  U.S.  gallon  of  gasoline.  Currency  conversions  based  on  average  exchange  rates through  the  first  4 months  of  2009.  (Germany  joins  EU  in  tying  car  fees  to  emissions.2009; ACEA, 2008; An & Sauer, 2004; Bank of Canada, 2009; Ward's, 2007; Ward's, 2008; Ward's, 2009) 
European Policy 
per (g CO2/km) 
Equivalent for Average U.S. Car 
per (l/100km) 
 
Acquisition Tax Annual 
Ownership Tax 
Acquisition Tax Annual 
Ownership Tax 
France € 18 € 2-19 5 $ 620    $ 520 5 
Germany N/A € 2.00 N/A    $ 70 
United Kingdom N/A ~£ 1.30-3.50 N/A ~$ 50 
Portugal € 5-115 ~€ 1.00-3.00 $ 2,900 ~$ 30 




2.3 Incentives Targeting Performance A  number  of  European  countries  employ  incentives  targeting  attributes  closely related  to  performance.  Here,  two  types  of  incentives  are  considered:  those targeting engine displacement, and those targeting engine power. 
2.3.1 Engine Displacement Incentives Both  Portugal  and  Belgium  base  their  vehicle  acquisition  and  ownership  taxes  in part on engine displacement. Portugal charges an acquisition tax of €0.90 for each cubic centimeter (cc) of displacement up to 1,250 cc, and €4.25 for each cc in excess of 1,250. Its annual ownership tax increases with displacement, with a net effect on the order of € 0.05‐0.25 per cc. Belgium charges a progressive tax on displacement, with  the  marginal  rates  increasing  at  higher  displacements.  (ACEA,  2008)  The ranges of marginal tax rates in Portugal and Belgium are summarized in Table 2‐2. 
Table 2­2: Engine displacement‐based acquisition and ownership taxes for gasoline‐fueled cars in selected European countries. Also shown is the equivalent stringency of the European policies  if  applied  to  the  average  new  U.S.  car  in  2008.  Currency  conversions  based  on average exchange  rates  through  the  first 4 months of 2009.  (ACEA, 2008; Bank of Canada, 2009; Ward's, 2007; Ward's, 2008; Ward's, 2009) 
European Policy 
per cubic centimeter 
Equivalent for Average U.S. Car 
per second of 0-60 mph time 
 
Acquisition Tax Annual 
Ownership Tax 
Acquisition Tax Annual 
Ownership Tax 
Portugal € 0.90-4.25 ~€ 0.05-0.25    $ 3,600 ~$ 200 
Belgium ~ € 0.10-5.00 ~€ 0.20-0.90 ~$ 2,000 ~$ 600 
 The  average  car  sold  in  the  U.S.  would  pay  a  steep  price  for  its  performance  in Belgium or Portugal. Engine displacement is a major determinant of engine power, which in turn is a major driver of vehicle performance. By applying the correlations between these attributes (see Section 3.3.1 and Appendix A for these correlations), 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it  is  possible  to  estimate  the  marginal  tax  rate  per  unit  performance  that  would result  if  the European policies were  applied  to  the  average new model  year 2008 U.S.  car.  In  this  way,  the  equivalent  tax  rates  on  performance  (expressed  per  1‐second reduction in 0‐60 mph time) shown in Table 2‐2 were calculated. Including both  the  acquisition  tax  and  the  first  3  years  of  ownership  tax,  the  average  new model year 2008 U.S. car would face a marginal tax rate on its performance on the order of $4,000 per 1‐second reduction under both the Belgian and the Portuguese systems.   
2.3.2 Engine Power Incentives Several European countries, including Belgium and Italy, base vehicle taxes in whole or  in  part  on  engine  power.  As  discussed  in  the  preceding  section,  Belgium has  a progressive  registration  tax  schedule  based  on  engine  displacement.  However,  it also employs a parallel  tax schedule based on engine power, and registrants must pay the higher of  the two rates calculated  for a particular vehicle.  Italy bases both acquisition and ownership taxes on engine power. (ACEA, 2008) The marginal rates for these two countries are summarized in Table 2‐3. Using the correlation between power/weight ratio and acceleration developed in Section 3.3.1, the equivalent tax rates that would be imposed by these policies on the average new model year 2008 U.S.  car  were  calculated.  These  are  shown  in  Table  2‐3  as  well.  If  applied  to  the average new 2008 U.S. car, the Italian taxes would impose a total marginal rate on the order of $500 for each second of 0‐60 mph time, including both the acquisition tax  and  3  years  of  ownership  taxes.  The  marginal  rate  imposed  by  the  Belgian system  is  comparable  to  that  imposed  by  Belgium’s  parallel  displacement‐based system, indicating that the two are reasonably well coordinated. 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Table 2­3: Engine power‐based acquisition and ownership taxes for gasoline‐fueled cars in selected  European  countries.  Also  shown  is  the  equivalent  stringency  of  the  European policies  if  applied  to  the  average  new  U.S.  car  in  2008.  Currency  conversions  based  on average exchange  rates  through  the  first 4 months of 2009.  (ACEA, 2008; Bank of Canada, 2009; Ward's, 2007; Ward's, 2008; Ward's, 2009) 
European policy 
per kilowatt 
Equivalent for Average U.S. Car 
per second of 0-60 mph time 
 
Acquisition Tax Annual 
Ownership Tax 
Acquisition Tax Annual 
Ownership Tax 
Italy    € 3.51 € 2.58-4.26 ~ $120 ~$ 140 
Belgium ~€ 4-70 N/A ~ $ 2,000 N/A6 
2.4 Conclusions The U.S. and various European countries already employ policies  that place prices on  fuel  consumption  or  performance.  In  the  U.S.,  the  stringency  of  these  policies ranges  from  less  than $100  (the  civil  penalties  imposed by  the CAFE program)  to more  than  $700  (the  gas  guzzler  tax)  for  each  1l/100km  of  fuel  consumption. However, these policies do not apply to all vehicles. In Europe, tax policies based on CO2 emissions effectively put a price on fuel consumption as well,  imposing widely variable  tax  rates.  Among  major  European  automotive  markets,  the  tax  policies would  impose  rates  ranging  from  roughly  $200  ‐  $600  for  each  1l/100km of  fuel consumption.  These  values  are  generally  consistent  with  the  stringency  of  U.S. policies, but unlike the U.S., they apply to all cars. Several European countries have policies targeting attributes related to vehicle performance. The stringency of these policies  varies  widely,  and  if  applied  to  the  average  new  U.S.  car,  they  would generally impose marginal rates on the order of $500 ‐ $4,000 for each second of 0‐60 mph time.                                                         
6  Although  there  is  no  power‐based  ownership  tax  on  cars  in  Belgium,  the  displacement‐based ownership tax discussed in Section 2.3.1 still applies to these vehicles. 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3 Development of a Technology Allocation Model 
In  this  chapter,  the  development  of  the  technology  allocation model  is  explained. First,  the purpose of  the model and the associated principles are  introduced. Next, the  general  framework  for  the  model  is  developed.  Finally,  a  discussion  of  the specific assumptions and values used in the model is undertaken. 
3.1 Modeling Purpose and Principles The purpose of the technology allocation model is to identify the optimal allocation of efficiency‐enhancing  technologies among competing vehicle attributes,  from the perspective  of  the  auto  industry  as  a  whole.  Specifically,  the  model  trades  off performance  and  fuel  consumption  based  on  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for these  attributes.  The  fundamental  principle  underlying  the  model  is  that  of maximizing  the  value  delivered  to  consumers  by  new,  efficiency‐enhancing technologies. In its current form, the model is not intended to replicate the decisions of  individual auto manufacturers  for specific vehicle models;  rather,  it  is meant  to shed light on the trends and drivers affecting the industry as a whole. In addition, it must be emphasized  that  the model  is  focused on medium‐ and  long‐term  trends, which may be markedly different than short‐term responses. The purpose of the model is to calculate the optimal allocation of technology to the competing attributes of performance and fuel consumption over the medium to long term.  In  this  context,  the  term  “optimal”  does  not  refer  to  the  ideal  balancing  of performance  and  fuel  consumption  according  to  any normative  standard of  social welfare.  Rather,  “optimal”  refers  simply  to  the  balance  of  performance  and  fuel consumption  that  will  maximize  the  value  to  consumers,  as  measured  by  their aggregated  willingness  to  pay.  The  implied  perspective  is  that  of  automobile manufacturers  seeking  to  provide  the  best  possible  value  proposition  to  their customers,  in  order  to  maximize  their  own  profitability.  Understanding  the perspective of the manufacturers  is key, because they are the ones who ultimately decide on what  tradeoffs will be made  in a vehicle design and on the allocation of 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more  advanced  technologies  to  performance  and  fuel  consumption.  (Hill  et  al., 2007) Two assumptions are implicit in the definition of optimality employed in this work. First,  it  is  assumed  that  the  revenues  that  automobile  manufacturers  can  realize from  the  sale  of  a  vehicle  fleet  will  be  maximized  when  consumers’  value  is maximized.  Second,  it  is  assumed  that  the  cost  of  implementing  a  given  suite  of technologies  is  constant  regardless  of  how  the  technologies  are  applied  to performance  and  fuel  consumption.  If  applying  technology  toward  performance were  more  or  less  costly  than  applying  the  same  technology  toward  fuel consumption  reductions,  then  maximizing  consumer  value  (or  revenues)  alone would not be sufficient to identify the optimal allocation of technology. The  model’s  results  are  relevant  over  the  medium  to  long  term.  Klier  and  Linn (2008) have identified three stages of response to fuel economy regulations. In the short  term, which  they  define  as  1‐2  years,  a  firm’s  only  practical  response  to  an increase in fuel economy standards is to shift prices in order to influence the mix of vehicles they sell. Over the long term, which they identify as 10 years or more, firms can make decisions to employ additional advanced technology. Klier and Linn define the medium term as  falling between these two, and specifically  identify 5 years as the scale of a medium‐term response, relating this value to the design lifecycle of a typical vehicle model. During the medium term, they argue, manufacturers can make decisions  about  design  priorities  in  new  vehicles,  such  as  balancing  performance and fuel consumption. (Klier & Linn, 2008) New vehicle designs are typically begun 2‐3 years before a vehicle is launched, and a given design may be in production for 4‐5  years  (typically)  or  even  as  long  as  10  years.  Manufacturers  typically  have  a “cycle plan” in place that governs their portfolio planning process for the next 10‐15 years. (Hill et al., 2007) The purpose of the technology allocation model is to explore the  tradeoff  between  performance  and  fuel  consumption  that  occurs  over  the medium to long term. For these purposes, this is assumed to mean 10 years or more. The rationale for this definition is that 10 years is ample time for manufacturers to 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perceive a shift  in consumer preferences (or public policy signals),  to re‐prioritize design  attributes  in  the  product  planning  process,  and  to  get  the  re‐optimized models into production. Consumers’  value  of  vehicles  is  calculated  using  a  technique  based  on  the  Direct Value  method.  (McConville  &  Cook,  1996;  Monroe  &  Cook,  1997)  The  value  to consumers  is  calculated  by  multiplying  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  an improvement  in  an  attribute  by  the  degree  to  which  that  attribute  is  improved. Consumers  have  heterogeneous  preferences,  and  it  is  expected  that  there  is  a distribution  of  willingness  to  pay  values  among  different  vehicle  purchasers. Therefore,  the median willingness  to  pay  is  used  as  the  basis  of  calculating  value throughout  this work.  (Monroe & Cook, 1997) Additionally,  it  is  assumed  that  the value of performance is independent of the value of fuel consumption, meaning that the total value can be determined by adding the two independent values associated with performance improvements and fuel consumption improvements. (McConville & Cook, 1996) In this work,  it will be helpful  to distinguish between the terms willingness to pay (WTP) and value. The term value  is used here to describe the total  increase  in the amount of money that a consumer would spend on a vehicle due to an improvement in an attribute. The term willingness to pay is used to describe the marginal amount that  a  consumer  would  be  willing  to  pay  per  unit  improvement  in  a  particular attribute – that is, the partial derivative of value with respect to that attribute. For example,  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  horsepower  might  be  $10  per horsepower. If horsepower were increased by 10 hp, then consumers’ value of the horsepower increase would be $100. 
3.2 Model Structure The  technology  allocation  model  is  based  on  the  principle  of  optimizing  the application  of  new,  efficiency‐enhancing  technologies  to  competing  vehicle attributes.  As  currently  implemented,  the  model  trades  off  two  key  vehicle 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attributes: performance (as measured by the 0‐60 mile per hour acceleration time) and  fuel  consumption  (the  inverse  of  fuel  economy,  measured  in  liters  of  fuel consumed per 100 km driven). The model is designed to answer the question, 
What is the optimal balance of performance and fuel consumption that 
will maximize the value of these attributes to consumers, subject to the 
constraint of technological feasibility? The  optimal  balance  of  performance  and  fuel  consumption  is  determined  by maximizing the combined value of reductions in acceleration time and reductions in fuel consumption, as discussed in Section 3.1. The technological constraint is based on  extrapolations  of  past  trends,  confirmed  by  engineering  assessments  of  likely technological improvements, as discussed in Section 3.3.2. 
3.2.1 Value of New Technologies The  total  value  to  consumers  of  improved  technology  (∆Vtech)  is  calculated  as  the sum of the increase in value due to better fuel consumption (∆VFC) and the value due to faster acceleration (∆VA), as shown in Equation 3‐1.  
Equation 3­1   
The  values  of  lower  fuel  consumption  and  faster  acceleration  are  calculated  as shown in Equation 3‐2 and Equation 3‐3, respectively.  
Equation 3­2   
Equation 3­3   
In  Equation  3‐2,  FC0  is  the  baseline  fuel  consumption,  FCy  is  the  final  fuel consumption  in  year  y,  vFC  represents  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  per  unit reduction  in  fuel  consumption.    Similarly,  in Equation 3‐3, A0  is  the baseline 0‐60 mph time, Ay is the 0‐60 mph acceleration time in year y, and vA is the willingness of 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consumers  to  pay  for  each  unit  reduction  in  0‐60  mph  acceleration  time.  In  the present work,  the willingness  to  pay  values  reflect  the  preferences  of  the median consumer,  although  a  similar  approach  could  be  applied  using  disaggregated consumer preference data. 
3.2.2 Constraints on Technological Feasibility The  range  of  feasible  combinations  of  fuel  consumption  and  acceleration performance is limited by the technological capabilities of the auto industry at any given time. For positive values of willingness to pay in the framework given above, total willingness to pay would be maximized by reducing both acceleration time and fuel  consumption  to  zero, which  is  obviously  a  technical  impossibility.  In  general, the  technological  constraint  can  be  represented mathematically  by  the  inequality shown  in  Equation  3‐4,  in  which  p>0  and  q<0.  This  relationship  is  discussed  in greater detail in Section 3.3.2.  
Equation 3­4  
The technological constraint states that for a given level of technological capability, the  minimum  0‐60  mph  time  varies  with  the  fuel  consumption.  As  discussed  in Section 1.1, the efficient use of technological capabilities demands that A will always be  set  equal  to  the  minimum  level  feasible  according  to  the  constraint  given  by Equation 3‐4. 
3.2.3 Optimizing Technology Allocation Because the current model trades off only two parameters,  it  is straightforward to maximize  willingness  to  pay  by  substituting  Equation  3‐2,  Equation  3‐3,  and Equation 3‐4 into Equation 3‐1 and differentiating with respect to fuel consumption, which yields the following: 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Equation 3­5 
 To  locate  the  critical  level  of  fuel  consumption  for  which  Vtech  is  maximized,  the expression in Equation 3‐5 is set equal to zero and rearranged: 
Equation 3­6 
 Equation 3‐6 provides  the optimal  level of  fuel consumption when given values of willingness‐to‐pay  for  fuel  consumption  and  acceleration,  and when  the  technical tradeoff  between  performance  and  fuel  consumption  is  well  characterized.  The result is then used to calculate the optimal acceleration time and the corresponding increases in consumers’ value. In addition, the optimal fuel consumption is used to calculate the optimal ERFC that corresponds to the specified conditions. Under these optimal conditions, the marginal increase in value due to for lower fuel consumption is exactly offset by the marginal decrease in value that comes from the necessarily slower acceleration. 
3.3 Model Inputs & Assumptions 




In Equation 3‐7, P is the vehicle’s rated peak horsepower, WI is the vehicle’s inertia weight (curb weight plus 300 pounds), and c and d are constants. EPA employs one set  of  values  of  c  and  d  for  vehicles  with  manual  transmissions  and  another  for vehicles with automatic transmissions, (U.S. EPA, 2008) as noted in Table 3‐1. The two correlations produce estimates that differ by 3% or less over the range of P/WI values  applicable  to  most  vehicles.  These  correlations,  however,  are  based  on vehicles from 1974‐1975, (Malliaris, Hsia, & Gould, 1976) making their applicability to today’s cars questionable. 
Table 3­1: Constants used by EPA  (U.S. EPA, 2008)  and Berry(Berry, 2010)  to  estimate 0‐60 mph times, and constants derived in this work from Consumer Reports data.(Consumer Reports, 2009) 
 c d 
EPA: Automatic 0.892 -0.805 
EPA: Manual 0.967 -0.775 
Berry 0.845 -0.757 
This Work 0.668 -0.865 The  correlations  used  by  EPA  to  estimate  0‐60  mph  times  over‐predict  the acceleration  times  for modern  vehicles.  In  a  forthcoming  thesis,  Berry  compiled  a list  of  reported 0‐60 mph  times  for modern  (model  year 2007 and  later)  vehicles and  found  that  the EPA correlations generally over‐predict  the 0‐60 mph  time  for most  contemporary vehicles by 1‐2  seconds.  (Berry, 2010) Modern vehicles  likely realize  0‐60  times  superior  to  those  of  1970s‐era  vehicles  with  the  same  P/WI values because of  improvements  in  transmission technology,  flatter  torque curves, and reductions in rolling resistance and aerodynamic drag. Berry fit a curve of the same form as Equation 3‐7 to her data, and the parameters for her correlation are 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listed in Table 3‐1. Berry’s data and correlation are compared with the EPA curves in Figure 3‐1. Although Berry’s correlation provides a better fit than the EPA curves, especially  for  P/WI  values  in  the  range  of  0.06‐0.12  hp/lb,  her  curve  appears  to under‐predict  0‐60  mph  times  in  the  0.03‐0.05  hp/lb  range.  The  latter  range includes many of the most popular models, accounting for more than half of all car volume in the U.S. in 2008. (Ward's, 2007; Ward's, 2008; Ward's, 2009) 
 
Figure  3­1:  Acceleration  and  Power/Weight  relationships  reported  by  EPA  and  Berry (includes both cars and light trucks).(Berry, 2010) A  second  set  of  data,  from  Consumer  Reports  (2009),  provides  the  basis  for  a correlation that better estimates the 0‐60 mph times  in the region of  interest. The Consumer  Reports  data  include  many  of  the  most  popular  vehicles  sold  in  the United States between 2003 and 2009. (Ward's, 2008; Ward's, 2009) Figure 3‐2 and Figure  3‐3  show  the  relationships  between  power/weight  ratio  and  acceleration times  as  reported  by  Consumer  Reports  for  cars  with  automatic  and  manual transmissions,  respectively, along with  fitted curves of  the  form given  in Equation 3‐7. 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The analysis of  the Consumer Reports data confirms  that while EPA’s correlations over‐predict  0‐60 mph  times  for modern  cars,  Berry’s  correlation  under‐predicts them. The correlation developed here for cars with automatic transmissions, based on Consumer Reports data, is compared with the curves reported by Berry and EPA in Figure 3‐4. Also shown are the data points employed by Berry and those obtained from Consumer Reports.  
 
Figure  3­4:  Comparison  of  Acceleration  –  Power/Weight  relationships.  The  correlation developed here  from Consumer Reports  data  provides  a  better  fit  at  the  lower  end  of  the power/weight  range, where most  of  today’s  popular  vehicles  fall.  (Berry,  2010;  Consumer Reports, 2009; U.S. EPA, 2008) Analyses throughout the rest of this work are based on the correlation derived from Consumer Reports’  data  for  cars with  automatic  transmissions, which  is  the most relevant correlation for the purposes of this research. Approximately 80 percent of cars sold in the United States in 2008 had automatic transmissions. (U.S. EPA, 2008) Furthermore,  this work  is  principally  concerned with  the  behavior  of  the  average new car, rather than with the high‐performance outliers that bias Berry’s data. The Consumer Reports data cover the entire range of power/weight values that would 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be  expected  for  the  average  new  car  between  now  and  2035,  for  ERFC  values between 0 and 150 percent and rates of technological improvement consistent with historic trends. (see Section 3.3.2) 
3.3.2 The Acceleration - Fuel Consumption Tradeoff In this work, the growth in technological capabilities over time is modeled using the performance‐size‐fuel  economy  index  (PSFI).  An  and  DeCicco  (2007)  developed PSFI  as  a  metric  for  overall  technical  efficiency  of  cars,  based  on  three  primary measures of vehicle utility: size, power/weight, and fuel economy. PSFI is defined in Equation 3‐8, in which P and WI have the same meaning as in Equation 3‐7, S is its interior volume (size) in ft3, and FE is its fuel economy in mpg. (An & DeCicco, 2007) The  suitability  of PSFI  for modeling  the performance‐fuel  consumption  tradeoff  is evaluated later in this section. 
Equation 3­8 
 




In  the  above  expression,  c  has  a  value  of  0.668  (as  in  Table  3‐1),  S  (the  interior volume) is assumed to equal its 2005 value of 111 ft3, and k =235.2 mpg‐(l/100km) is  a  conversion  factor used  to  convert  between  fuel  economy  in units  of mpg  and fuel consumption in units of liters/100km. 
 




Figure 3­6: Comparison of modeled performance‐fuel consumption tradeoff with actual mix of cars offered in the U.S.  in model year 2008 (excluding hybrids). (U.S. EPA, 2008; Ward's, 2007; Ward's, 2008; Ward's, 2009) A  second  check on  the  validity  of  the  tradeoff modeling methodology  comes  from the  work  of  Cheah  et  al.  (2008).  Cheah  et  al.  reported  results  characterizing  the tradeoff  between  0‐60  mph  time  and  fuel  consumption  for  naturally  aspirated, spark‐ignition  cars  in  2035.  The  0‐60  mph  times  reported  were  calculated  from P/WI  values using  the EPA  correlation discussed  in  Section 3.3.1.  For purposes of the  present work,  the  0‐60 mph  times were  recalculated  from Cheah  et  al’s  P/WI values  using  the  newer  correlation  reported  in  Section  3.3.1  (based  on Consumer Reports’ values of 0‐60 mph times for current cars), in order to ensure consistency with other  calculations  in  this work. The  recalculated 0‐60 mph  times are plotted against  unadjusted  fuel  consumption  in  Figure  3‐7,  and  are  shown with  the PSFI‐based tradeoff curve for 2035. From Figure 3‐7, it is evident that the methodology of 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Cheah  et  al.  yields  a  very  similar  prediction  of  the  performance‐fuel  economy tradeoff in 2035 as the PSFI‐based methodology, which lends further support to the validity of the PSFI‐based methodology. 
 
Figure  3­7:  The  performance‐fuel  consumption  tradeoff  modeled  using  the  methodology developed in this section agrees well with the results of Cheah et al. (2008) for 2035. 
3.3.3 Willingness to Pay for Fuel Consumption Improvements A number of authors have estimated consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for lower fuel consumption in their vehicles, and their results vary widely. The willingness  to  pay  for  fuel  consumption  is  frequently  estimated  in  terms of  a payback period, which may be expressed as years of ownership or as miles driven. This  raises  two  important  points.  First,  it  should  be  noted  that  estimating willingness  to  pay  in  terms  of  a  payback  period  does  not  imply  any  presumption that consumers explicitly calculate  fuel expenses and weigh these against up‐front costs. Quite  the  contrary,  a  recent  study of  car‐buyers’  decision‐making processes found  that  none  of  the  interviewees  had  evaluated  fuel  costs  in  an  objective  and quantitative  fashion,  even  in  households  comprising  two  “financial  service 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professionals.”  (Turrentine  &  Kurani,  2007)  Instead,  the  implication  of  using  a payback period is merely that consumers’ willingness to pay is generally consistent with such a calculation. (Greene, German, & Delucchi, 2009)  A second key point about using payback period as a basis  for willingness to pay is that such an approach implicitly assumes that the willingness to pay for lower fuel consumption  is  directly  proportional  to  the  price  of  fuel,  which  is  likely  a  better assumption over the medium to long term than in the short term. Sterman has found that  individuals’ expectations of  future values of a variable (such as price) depend not  only  on  the  variable’s  current  value,  but  on  perceived  trends  as  well  as  the individual’s  intuitive  sense  of  what  the  “right”  value  is.  (Sterman,  2000)  This suggests  that  as  fuel  prices  change  after  a  period  of  stability,  consumers  may initially  expect  them  to  revert  to  their  original  values,  and  later  would  tend  to extrapolate observed price increases into the future. The result  is that  in the short term, consumers’ expectations of fuel prices may differ significantly from actual fuel prices.  However,  this  work  is  principally  concerned  with  changes  in  technology allocation  over  the  medium  to  long  term  (~10  years  or  more).  Therefore,  it  is assumed that consumers’ willingness to pay for fuel consumption will re‐equilibrate to a level proportional to the price of fuel, after a sustained change in fuel prices. Greene, German, and Delucchi  (Greene et al., 2009) and Greene et al. (Greene et al., 2005) make convincing arguments that that consumers value fuel savings only over the first 3 years or roughly 50,000 miles that they will own a vehicle. They rely on a number  of  sources,  including  work  by  the  Department  of  Energy  and  market research by the auto industry, to reach this conclusion. In addition, Greene, German, and  Delucchi  offer  a  model  based  on  bounded  rationality  and  risk‐aversion  that accounts  for consumers’  low willingness  to pay. Adler et al.  found  that  consumers would  demand  an  undiscounted  payback  of  between  2  and  10  years  for  up‐front investments  in  fuel  savings.  (Adler,  Wargelin,  Kostyniuk,  Kalavec,  &  Occhiuzzo, 2004) While this range appears to reflect the wide variability in the preferences of 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the population, it says nothing about where in this range the majority of consumers, or the median consumer, falls.   Other authors have concluded that consumers’ willingness to pay is higher than that corresponding to a 3‐year payback.  Donndelinger and Cook (Donndelinger & Cook, 1997) reported results from a survey of 858 respondents which estimated a value to consumers of  $360‐$1,230  for  each mpg  improvement.  Expressed  in 2007 dollars their  results  are  equivalent  to  $1,300‐$3,000  for  each  1l/100km  reduction  in laboratory  fuel  consumption.  These  values  are  significantly  greater  than  the economic value of  the  fuel savings over  the entire  life of  the vehicle, even without discounting. McConville and Cook (McConville & Cook, 1996) reported results from a  similar,  but  smaller  and  admittedly  unrepresentative  survey.  They  reported  a consumer value  increase of $170‐$300 per mpg  improvement, which  is equivalent to $610‐$960 for each 1l/100km reduction in laboratory fuel consumption, in 2007 dollars, equivalent to roughly a 6‐10 year payback. In this work, a 3‐year payback  is used in the development of baseline scenarios. A variety  of  studies  confirm  the  3‐year  estimate  from  both  the  consumers’  and manufacturers’  perspective,  and  a  plausible  theoretical  explanation  for  the  short payback  has  been  offered.  Consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  lower  fuel consumption,  expressed  in  terms  of  the  dollars  they  are  willing  to  pay  for  each 1l/100km reduction, is therefore estimated to be: 
Equation 3­10 
 
In Equation 3‐10, n is the length of the assumed payback period, in years, and Pfuel is the  expected  per‐liter  price  of  fuel  over  the  payback  period.  VKT  is  the  annual distance traveled by the vehicle (vehicle kilometers traveled), which is assumed to be  24,135  km  (15,000  miles)  per  year.  This  figure  is  close  (within  3%)  to  the average  distance  traveled  over  the  first  three  years  of  ownership  according  to 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Bandivadekar  et  al.  and  Greene.  (Bandivadekar  et  al.,  2008;  Greene,  2001)  In addition,  15,000  miles  per  year  is  the  same  distance  used  by  DOE  and  EPA  in estimating  annual  fuel  costs  presented  to  consumers  in  the  annual  Fuel  Economy Guide. (U.S. Department of Energy & U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008) In Equation 3‐10, α is the on‐road correction factor that defines the ratio of in‐use fuel economy  to  laboratory  test  fuel  economy.  According  to  estimation  procedures recently  adopted  by  the  U.S.  Environmental  Protection  Agency,  a  decreases  with increasing fuel economy, and falls between 0.7 and 0.8 for vehicles offered for sale in  2008.  (40  CFR  600.210‐08)  (U.S.  EPA,  2009)  Within  the  range  of  30‐50  mpg, which is of greatest relevance to the present work, a falls between 0.76 and 0.73. In the interest of simplicity, a is assumed to have a constant value of 0.75 throughout this work. Historic  United  States  gasoline  price were  shown  in  Figure  1‐5.  Prices  have  been notoriously  volatile  recently,  but  were  in  fact  relatively  stable  and  constant  for nearly  20  years,  between  1986  and  2003.    During  this  time,  the  price  averaged approximately $1.70 per gallon in real terms (2007 dollars). Assuming  a  fuel  price  of    $0.45/liter  ($1.70  per  gallon)  and  a  3‐year  payback, Equation  3‐10  yields  an  estimated willingness  to  pay  of  $430  for  each  1l/100km reduction in (laboratory) fuel consumption. This value is used as the willingness to pay  in  the  business‐as‐usual,  constant  fuel  price,  baseline  scenario  in  Section  4.2. Willingness to pay is readily calculated for other values of payback period and fuel price, and the change in WTP is proportional to the changes in these parameters. 
3.3.4 Willingness to Pay for Performance Two main types of data were used to estimate consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for  better  vehicle  performance.  First,  literature  evaluating  consumers’  WTP  was reviewed.  Second,  price  differentials  for  4‐  and  6‐cylinder  versions  of  current  car models were calculated. 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A  number  of  authors  have  reported  estimates  of  consumers’  WTP  for  faster acceleration, expressed in terms of a variety of units.7 The estimates were converted to a common baseline of dollars per 1‐second reduction in 0‐60 mph time ($/s) and converted to year 2007 dollars, and the resulting estimates are plotted in Figure 3‐8 against  their  year  of  publication.  There  is  considerable  variation  in  the  estimates, which yield both a median and a mean value of $385 for each 1‐second reduction. No particular time trend in the WTP is apparent in Figure 3‐8.  
 
Figure  3­8:  Literature  estimates  of  willingness  to  pay  for  improved  acceleration  (2007 dollars  per  1‐second  reduction  in  0‐60  mph  time).  (Adler  et  al.,  2004;  Bureau  of  Labor Statistics,  2008;  Donndelinger  &  Cook,  1997;  Greene  &  Liu,  1988;  Greene,  2001;  Greene, Duleep, & McManus, 2004) Price  data  from  contemporary  vehicle  models  provide  a  useful  check  against  the more  academic  estimates  of WTP  that  are  found  in  the  literature,  although  price differences  are  not  necessarily  the  same  as  the  WTP  values  we  are  seeking. Throughout  this  work,  we  are  working  with  the  median  WTP  as  the  basis  of calculating  changes  in  vehicle  value,  as  discussed  in  Section  3.1.  For  any  given                                                         
7 The units reported include the WTP per second reduction in 0‐60 mph time, per horsepower, per unit torque, and per unit improvement in engine displacement per pound of vehicle weight. 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attribute,  there  is  presumably  a  distribution  in  WTP  across  the  population  of consumers.  If  consumers are offered  some optional  feature  at  a  certain price,  and fewer  than 50% of  them choose  that option,  then we can  safely  conclude  that  the median WTP  is  less  than the price. Similarly,  if more than 50% choose the option, we can conclude that the median WTP is greater than the option price. (Monroe & Cook, 1997) Willingness to pay therefore cannot be determined in any meaningful way from price data unless corresponding market share data are also known. To elucidate manufacturers’ perceptions of WTP for acceleration, comparisons were made between comparably‐equipped 4‐cylinder and 6‐cylinder versions of popular U.S. models. Although manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) data are readily available  for  most  vehicles  (for  example,  from  Ward’s  Automotive),  the  values reported  are  generally  for  the  base  MSRP  (the  price  of  the  vehicle  without  any optional equipment). Frequently, a 6‐cylinder engine is bundled with several other options that also serve to increase the price. As a result, the difference between the base  prices  of  4‐cylinder  and  6‐cylinder  versions  of  the  same model  is  driven  by more than just the difference in engines.8 To obtain a more reasonable comparison, prices  were  obtained  using  “build  and  price”  tools  available  on  manufacturers’ websites.  This  provides  a  reliable  if  time‐consuming  means  of  determining  the difference in MSRP due solely to switching from a 4‐cylinder to a 6‐cylinder engine. Manufacturer’s  suggested  retail  prices  and  0‐60  mph  times  of  4‐cylinder  and  6‐cylinder  versions  of  several  popular  U.S.  car  models  were  gathered  from manufacturers’ websites and from Consumer Reports. The full data are presented in Appendix C. For each model, the difference in MSRP was divided by the difference in 0‐60 mph  time  for  two  versions.  In  this way,  the  price  premium  expected  by  the manufacturer  for  each  1‐second  reduction  in  0‐60  mph  time  was  estimated.  The                                                         
8 For example, the 2009 Honda Accord V6 has a base MSRP of $26,605 while the 4‐cylinder version has a base MSRP of $20,905. However, even the most basic V6 includes features that are not included on the entry‐level 4‐cylinder trim, including an automatic transmission, alloy wheels, moonroof, and many others. In this case, it is unreasonable to attribute the entire $5,700 price premium solely to the difference in engines. 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resulting price premiums are plotted  in Figure 3‐9 along with  the  fraction of each model equipped with V6 engines.9 For comparison purposes, Figure 3‐9 also shows the  range of median WTP values  reported  in  the  literature, which were discussed above. 
 
Figure 3­9: Price premiums and take rates for higher‐performance engines, compared with literature  estimates  of  willingness  to  pay  for  performance.  (American  Honda Motor  Co.,  ; Consumer  Reports,  2009;  Ford Motor  Company,  ;  Ford Motor  Company,  ;  General Motors Corporation,  ; Hyundai Motor America,  ; Mazda North American Operations,  ; Nissan North America, ; Toyota Motor Sales, ; Ward's, 2008; Ward's, 2009) The price  premiums  calculated  from MSRP data  are  generally  consistent with  the literature estimates of WTP for performance, despite being somewhat higher. There is considerable variability among the different vehicles investigated, but nearly all of them indicate a price premium greater than the range of WTP values reported in the 
                                                        
9 Price premium data were collected  from manufacturers’ websites  in  January‐February, 2009, and are for model year 2009 vehicles. Engine market shares were calculated based on Ward’s Automotive data  for model  years 2007  and 2008,  because 2009  share data  are not  yet  available.  Full  data  are provided in Appendix C. 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literature, averaging approximately $1,100 for each 1‐second reduction. These two findings are not necessarily inconsistent, however, because fewer than 50% of most models (an average of 30% in 2008) were equipped with the V6, indicating that the median  WTP  is  actually  lower  than  the  price  premium  calculated.  In  results reported  by  Adler  et  al.,  consumers’ WTP  for  acceleration was  found  to  be  $100‐$300  per  1‐second  reduction  in  0‐60 mph  time,  but  this  translated  into  purchase price increases of $1000 per second. (Adler et al., 2004) Additionally, benefits of the V6  engine  may  not  be  limited  just  to  performance  improvements.  The  V6  may provide additional value to the consumer in the form of reduced noise and vibration, which  would  cause  the  performance  premiums  calculated  here  to  be  too  high. (Magee, 2009) 
3.4 Conclusions In  this  chapter,  the  principles,  framework,  and  assumptions  underlying  the technology allocation model were presented. The model is designed to optimize the allocation  of  more  advanced  technologies  among  the  competing  attributes  of performance and fuel consumption by maximizing the value provided to consumers by  these  attributes.  The  range  of  feasible  combinations  of  performance  and  fuel consumption is constrained by the availability of technology, which is projected by extrapolating  past  trends  and  confirmed  by  modeling‐based  work.  Consumers’ willingness to pay for fuel consumption is estimated to be $430 for each 1l/100km reduction,  which  corresponds  to  a  three‐year  payback,  assuming  a  fuel  price  of $1.70  per  gallon,  which  was  the  average  real  price  from  1986‐2003.  Literature estimates  of  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  performance  were  reviewed,  and found to range from $200 ‐ $600 for each 1‐second reduction in 0‐60 mph time. The pricing of some of  today’s most popular U.S. car models reveals a higher premium for  performance,  but  one  that  is  not  entirely  inconsistent  with  the  literature estimates. In the following chapter, the ranges of estimated WTP will be narrowed further by using historical data,  in order develop more useful projections of future technology allocation decisions. 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4 Calibration of Baseline Scenario 
4.1 Historic Willingness to Pay for Performance and Fuel Consumption Historic trends in the allocation of technology to performance and fuel consumption can  help  inform  the  assumptions  underlie  predictions  of  future  technology decisions. From a manufacturer’s perspective,  the optimal allocation of  technology to the competing attributes of performance and fuel consumption depends upon the relative  value  that  these  attributes  deliver  to  consumers  (i.e.  “How  much  will consumers pay  for performance versus  fuel consumption?”), and the nature of  the technical tradeoff between these attributes (i.e. “How much performance do I need to  give  up  in  order  to  improve  fuel  consumption?”).  In  the  preceding  chapter,  a model  incorporating  these  factors  was  developed  for  predicting  the  optimal allocation  of  technologies  in  the  future.  In  order  to  narrow  the  range  of  plausible values of willingness to pay for performance and fuel consumption, the model was adapted to look at the historic allocation of technology to these two attributes. It  is  necessary  to  obtain more  precise  estimates  of  consumers’ willingness  to  pay (WTP) for improvements in performance and fuel consumption. In Section 3.3, WTP for  improvements  in performance and  fuel  consumption were estimated, but very broad  ranges  were  found  for  both  parameters.  Literature  estimates  of  WTP  for performance ranged from $200‐$600 per 1‐second reduction 0‐60 mph time. Price data for actual vehicles was generally consistent with the high end of this range, but was not sufficient to pinpoint WTP precisely. Similarly, broad variability was found in the WTP for improved fuel consumption, with payback periods ranging from two years to more than the life of the car. It will be shown later in this chapter that the variability in these parameters is so broad, and the optimal allocation of technology so  sensitive  to  these  values,  that  it  is  impossible  to make  a  useful  assessment  of technology allocation decisions without have a more precise estimate of the relative WTP for performance and fuel consumption. 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It is possible to estimate the relative WTP for performance and fuel consumption by examining how these parameters have evolved during historic periods of stable fuel prices.  During  such  periods,  it  is  assumed  that  consumers’  WTP  for  fuel consumption  is  relatively  constant,  that manufacturers  are  able  to  elicit  this WTP through  market  research  and  other  “voice  of  the  consumer”  tools,  and  that  the actual  decisions  made  by  the  manufacturers  represent  the  optimal  allocations  of technology.  It  is  more  difficult  to  assess  the  relative  WTP  for  attributes  during periods  of  unstable  fuel  prices,  because WTP  for  fuel  consumption  is  expected  to change with fuel price, as discussed in Section 3.3.3. Since manufacturers need 5‐10 years to readjust their design priorities and turn over the designs of their vehicles, (Hill  et  al.,  2007)  it would be unreasonable  to  assume  that  technology  allocations made less than 5 years after a shift in fuel prices represent the optimum. Gasoline  prices  in  the  United  States  were  relatively  constant  in  real  terms  from 1986‐2003, (Figure 1‐5) so it is to this period that we turn to evaluate the historic trends in the performance‐fuel economy tradeoff. The period from 1991‐2003 is of particular interest, for two reasons. First, it begins 5 years into the period of stable fuel prices, allowing time for manufacturers to have perceived and reacted to more stable  consumer  preferences.  Second,  the  Corporate  Average  Fuel  Economy Standard  for  cars  did  not  change  during  this  period,  and  changed  only  slightly during  the  5  preceding  years  (Figure  1‐6).  (National  Highway  Traffic  Safety Administration, 2004) Figure  4‐1  shows  the  progression  of  the  average  0‐60 mph  time  and  unadjusted (laboratory)  fuel  consumption  for  U.S.  cars  from  1991‐2003.  The  general  trend downward  and  only  slightly  to  the  left  reflects  the  generally  low  emphasis  on reducing  fuel  consumption  that was  observed  during  this  period.  For  three  years (1991,  1997,  and  2003),  the  performance‐fuel  consumption  tradeoff  curves  have been  added  to  Figure  4‐1,  representing  the  frontier  of  technically  efficient combinations  of  acceleration  and  fuel  consumption  feasible  in  each  year  (see Section  1.1).  These  curves  are  derived  using  the  performance‐size‐fuel  economy 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index (PSFI) based methodology that is discussed in Section 3.3.2, and are analogous to  the curves  in Figures 3‐5, 3‐6,  and 3‐7.  (The curvature of  these  relationships  is more  difficult  to  discern  in  Figure  4‐1  because  of  the  narrow  ranges  of  fuel consumption and acceleration shown in the plot.) 
 
Figure 4­1: Historic tradeoffs between performance and fuel consumption for U.S. cars. The individual  points  mark  the  combinations  of  average  0‐60  mph  time  and  average  fuel consumption in each year. 0‐60 mph times are recalculated from EPA data using relationship developed  in  Section  3.3.1.  The  performance‐fuel  consumption  tradeoff  curves  are  of  the form given by Equation 3‐4 and Equation 3‐9. Adapted from (U.S. EPA, 2008). Also  shown  in  Figure  4‐1  are  lines  tangent  to  the  performance‐fuel  economy tradeoff curves at the points of actual fuel economy and acceleration, the slopes of which  define  the  ratio  of  WTP  for  fuel  consumption  to  WTP  for  acceleration.  Substituting  Equation  3‐1  and  Equation  3‐2  into  Equation  3‐3,  and  simplifying, yields Equation 4‐1,  in which C  is a constant corresponding to a particular  level of consumer  value.  Thus,  Equation  4‐1  defines  a  line  representing  the  set  of performance‐fuel  consumption  combinations  that  yield  a  particular  level  of consumer  value.  When  technology  allocation  is  optimized  (i.e.  when  consumers’ 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value is maximized), this line must be tangent to the performance‐fuel consumption tradeoff  curve.  Similarly,  if we  assume  that  the  historic  allocation  of  technologies was indeed optimal, then we can conclude that the slope of the tangent is equal to ‐vFC/vA, which  is  the negative of  the ratio of consumers’ WTP  for  fuel  consumption and acceleration reductions. In this way, it is possible to estimate the historic ratio between  WTP  for  fuel  consumption  reductions  and  WTP  for  acceleration improvements. 
Equation 4­1   





Figure  4­2:  Historic  ratio  of  WTP  for  fuel  consumption  reduction  (vFC)  to  WTP  for acceleration  improvements  (vA)  during  period  of  stable  gasoline  prices.  Units  for  fuel consumption are dollars per 1l/100km reduction, and units for acceleration are dollars per 1‐second reduction. 
 
Figure 4­3: Historic WTP for reductions in 0‐60 mph time, average U.S. cars. Estimated from vFC/vA  values,  assuming  constant  WTP  for  fuel  consumption  of  $430  for  each  1l/100km reduction. (See Section 3.3.3) 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It  is  assumed  that  the  growth  in WTP  for  acceleration,  shown  in  Figure  4‐3,  will continue  into  the  future,  and  the  sensitivity  of  the  results  to  this  assumption  is explored.  If  the  growth  calculated  for  1991‐2003  is  linearly  extrapolated  through 2020,  an  estimated  WTP  of  $570  per  1‐second  reduction  in  0‐60  mph  time  is obtained, which  is used  in  the  calculation of  the baseline  scenario. Continuing  the linear extrapolation through 2035 yields an estimated WTP for acceleration of $650 per  1‐second  reduction.  A  number  of  explanations  can  be  imagined  for  continual growth  in WTP  for  acceleration.  It  is  possible  that  such  an  increase  is  driven  by income growth;  that as  car purchasers have more money  to  spend,  they are more willing  to  spend  some of  it  on  attributes  like  acceleration  that make  their  vehicle more fun to drive. Alternatively, it is possible that consumers want to have a vehicle that performs better than other vehicles on the road, creating a reinforcing loop in which new vehicles must become ever more powerful just to stay ahead of the pack. However, determining the causes of increasing WTP for performance is beyond the scope of this work. Suffice it to say that a trend of increasing WTP for acceleration improvements  seems at  least plausible. However,  extrapolating willingness  to pay so  far  into  the  future  is  highly  speculative,  especially  when  based  on  a  relatively short historic period. For this reason, the sensitivity of the modeled results to input assumptions is explored in the next section.  
4.2 Baseline Scenario Results The  technology  allocation  model  was  used  to  project  the  revenue‐maximizing allocation of  technologies to performance and fuel consumption  in 2020 and 2035 under  a  business‐as‐usual  scenario.  In  this  scenario,  it was  assumed  that  gasoline prices remained constant at $1.70 per gallon into the future, that consumers’ WTP for fuel consumption reductions also remained constant at $430 for each 1l/100km reduction, and that WTP for acceleration continued to increase, as discussed in the preceding section. The use of  this baseline scenario does not  imply an expectation that  gasoline  prices will  return  to  $1.70  per  gallon.  Rather,  it  is meant  to  denote what expectations would be if gasoline prices had not spiked beginning in 2004 and if  Corporate  Average  Fuel  Economy  standards  had  not  been  increased.  Thus,  it 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provides a useful starting point from which to evaluate the effects of changes in fuel price and policies affecting performance and  fuel  consumption. The  results of  this scenario are summarized in Table 4‐1. 
Table  4­1:  Optimal  (revenue‐maximizing)  technology  allocation  projections  for  baseline scenario in 2020 and 2035. 
2005 2020 2035 
WTP for Acceleration ($/second)  $570 $650 
Fuel Consumption (l/100km) 8.0 7.8 7.6 
0-60 mph Time (seconds) 8.6 6.9 5.9 
ERFC (since 2005)  8% 11% 
Value Increase (Fuel Consumption) - $70 $150 
Value Increase (Acceleration) - $980 $1,810 
Value Increase (Total) - $1,050 $1,960 
Under the baseline conditions, the emphasis on reducing fuel consumption would be expected  to  remain  very  low  through  2035,  as  consumers  continue  to  be  more willing  to  pay  for  improvements  in  acceleration  than  for  reductions  in  fuel consumption.  Although  the  fuel  consumption  of  the  average  new  car  could  be reduced  from  8.0  l/100km  to  6.0  l/100km  by  2020  while  maintaining  the  same performance  level  as  in  2005,  the  optimal  outcome  from  the  manufacturers’ perspective  is  for  fuel  consumption  to  be  reduced by  only  a  small  fraction  of  this amount, while  the average 0‐60 mph time  is reduced by 1.7 seconds, or 20%. The low  emphasis  on  reducing  fuel  consumption  is  consistent  with  historic  trends, which  have  seen  most  technology  directed  to  improvements  in  acceleration,  and ERFC values generally between 0 and 20%. (see Section 1.2) The  increase  in value  to  consumers due  to  improvements  in  acceleration and  fuel consumption  is  generally  consistent  with  the  estimated  retail  price  increase associated with  the  introduction of new  technologies.  In 2020,  it  is estimated  that the  average  consumer  would  be  willing  to  pay  a  total  of  $1,050  more  for  the 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improvements in acceleration and fuel consumption enabled by the introduction of new  technology. By 2035,  this  amount would  increase  to  $1,960.  For  comparison, Bandivadekar  et  al.  estimated  a  retail  price  increase  of  $2,000  due  to  the introduction  of  advanced  technologies  through  2035.  (Bandivadekar  et  al.,  2008) The  fact  that  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  matches  the  estimated  retail  price provides additional confidence in the soundness of the WTP values used here. 
4.3 Sensitivity of Model to Assumptions The sensitivity of  the modeled results  to underlying assumptions was explored by varying  the WTP  for  acceleration  and  fuel  consumption by 20% above  and below their baseline values. The optimal allocation of technologies as predicted by the model is quite sensitive to the assumed WTP for acceleration. The sensitivity was investigated by varying the WTP between $450 and $680 per second in 2020. A value of $450 per second (20% below baseline) is equal to the estimated WTP in 1999, and so seems to represent a reasonable lower bound on WTP for acceleration in 2020. The sensitivity results are summarized in Table 4‐2. If WTP for acceleration is 20% lower than in the baseline case,  the optimal ERFC rises  from 8% to 53%, while a WTP 20% greater  than  the baseline shifts ERFC down to ‐33%.  The negative emphasis on  reducing  fuel  consumption  found  in  the high‐WTP case may  seem  impossible,  or  at  least  counterintuitive,  and  demands  explanation.  It  is necessary  to  recall  the  definition  of  ERFC  (Equation  1‐1),  which  is  based  on  the reduction  in  fuel  consumption.  In  the  case  of  high  willingness  to  pay  for acceleration,  the  revenue‐maximizing  outcome  would  be  to  dedicate  not  only  all new technology toward improving acceleration, but also to accept even worse fuel consumption than in 2005, in order to obtain even deeper reductions in acceleration times. Because of the increase in fuel consumption in this case, the increase in value of  fuel  consumption  is  negative,  as  consumers  would  expect  “compensation”  in 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exchange  for  accepting  worse  higher  fuel  consumption.  This  compensation,  of course, comes in the form of further reductions in the 0‐60 mph time. 
Table 4­2: Sensitivity  of  optimal  (revenue‐maximizing)  technology  allocations  to WTP  for acceleration, with WTP for fuel consumption held constant at $430 per (1l/100km). 
2020 








Fuel Consumption (l/100km) 6.9 7.8 8.6 
0-60 mph Time (seconds) 7.7 6.9 6.4 
ERFC (since 2005) 53% 8% -33% 
Value Increase (Fuel Consumption) $450  $70  ‐$280 
Value Increase (Acceleration) $450  $980  $1,560 
Value Increase (Total) $900  $1,050  $1,280 
The WTP for  fuel consumption  improvements was varied between $350 and $520 for each 1l/100km reduction, and the results of this sensitivity analysis are shown in  Table  4‐3.  The  sensitivity  of  predicted  ERFC  to  WTP  for  fuel  consumption  is similar, but opposite  in sign,  to  the sensitivity  to WTP  for acceleration.  If WTP  for fuel  consumption  were  20%  higher,  ERFC  would  by  46%  instead  of  8%.  On  the other hand, if WTP for fuel consumption were 20% lower, the optimal ERFC would be ‐43%. An  interesting  question  here  is  why  the  total  consumer  value  (shown  in  the  last rows  in  Table  4‐2  and  Table  4‐3)  is  sensitive  to  the  WTP  for  acceleration  but insensitive to the WTP for  fuel consumption, even when ERFC is sensitive to both. This happens because the change is total value (the last row) is driven largely by the value  increase  due  to  performance  (the  second‐to‐last  row),  since  the  biggest changes  between  2005  and  2020  are  in  acceleration  times.  As  a  result,  a modest change  in  the  WTP  for  acceleration  has  significant  impact  on  total  value  of 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acceleration improvements. Since changes  in fuel consumption are relatively small in all  cases, changes  in  the WTP  for  fuel consumption have a smaller effect on  the overall value to consumers.  
Table 4­3: Sensitivity of optimal technology allocations to WTP for fuel consumption, with WTP for acceleration held constant at $570/second. 
2020 
WTP for Fuel Consumption 







Fuel Consumption (l/100km) 8.8  7.8  7.1 
0-60 mph Time (seconds) 6.2  6.9  7.5 
ERFC ‐43%  8%  46% 
Value Increase (Fuel Consumption) ‐$290  $70  $460 
Value Increase (Acceleration) $1,370  $980  $640 
Value Increase (Total) $1,080  $1,050  $1,100 
It  is also  surprising  that  the  total value  increase  is greater when  the WTP  for  fuel consumption is lower. The reason for this is that in the low‐WTP case, the optimal emphasis on reducing fuel consumption is negative and fuel consumption is higher in 2020 than in 2005. As a result, the value due to the change in fuel consumption is negative,  since  fuel  consumption has become worse. However,  the  lower WTP  for fuel consumption also means that the magnitude of the penalty for this inferior fuel consumption  becomes  smaller.  As  a  result,  the  gain  in  value  due  to  faster acceleration more than offsets the loss in value due to higher fuel consumption.  Table  4‐4  examines  the  sensitivity  of  the  model  results  to  simultaneous  and identical changes in WTP for fuel consumption and acceleration. If both WTP values are  increased  or  decreased  by  the  same  amount,  the  optimal  allocation  of technologies does not change, and ERFC remains at 8%. This is because the optimal allocation  of  technologies  depends  on  the  relative  values  of WTP  for  acceleration 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and WTP for  fuel consumption  improvements, as discussed earlier  in  this chapter, and as represented mathematically in Equation 3‐6. 
Table 4­4: Sensitivity of optimal ERFC to WTP for both acceleration and fuel consumption in 2020. 
WTP for Acceleration ($/second) 
WTP for Fuel Consumption 







$350 (-20%) 8%  ‐43%  ‐89% 
$430 (base) 54%  8%  ‐33% 
$520 (+20%) 87%  46%  8% 
The  cases  shown  in  the  upper  right  and  lower  left  corners  of  Table  4‐4  yield strikingly different results than the baseline assumptions. Such different results are not  unexpected  given  the  changes  in  assumptions,  but  such  large  variability may seem to call into question the very usefulness of the model. However, while there is uncertainty in the actual values of WTP for both acceleration and fuel consumption, we  can  return  here  to  the  historical  trend  in  the  performance‐fuel  consumption tradeoff,  discussed  in  Section  4.1.  The  historic  ratio  of WTP  for  fuel  consumption and  performance,  illustrated  in  Figure  4‐2,  helps  to  bound  the  range  of  plausible combinations of WTP values.  Scenarios in which WTP for acceleration is 20% above the baseline assumption and WTP for fuel consumption is 20% below, or vice versa, would be inconsistent with the historic values and trends seen in Figure 4‐2.  
4.4 Conclusions In this chapter, the historic tradeoff between acceleration and fuel consumption was examined  for  the  period  of  stable  gasoline  prices  from  1991‐2003.  The  historic trend  suggests  a  steady  increase  in  consumers’  WTP  for  acceleration  relative  to their WTP for fuel consumption. The WTP values implied by the historic trends are 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consistent  with  the  literature  and  price  data  presented  in  Chapter  3.  Under  a baseline  scenario  with  fuel  prices  constant  at  pre‐2004  levels  and  no  policy intervention,  the  technology  allocation model  predicts  that  emphasis  on  reducing fuel consumption would remain at approximately 10% through 2035. The model’s calculated  increase  in  consumer  value  of  improved  acceleration  and  fuel consumption is consistent with estimates of the retail price increase corresponding to the introduction of advanced technologies. The  optimal  ERFC  calculated  by  the  model  is  sensitive  to  consumers’  WTP  for performance and fuel consumption. As a result, caution is needed when interpreting model  results,  since  small  differences  in  WTP  can  produce  significantly  different estimates of optimal performance and fuel consumption. However, it is important to note that the optimal ERFC depends only on the relative, not the absolute, WTP for acceleration  and  fuel  consumption.  Moreover,  the  historic  pattern  of  technology allocation to performance and fuel consumption tends to support the projections of relative WTP  for  these  two attributes, despite  the  lingering uncertainty over  their precise magnitude. 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5 Evaluation of Policies to Influence Performance and Fuel 
Consumption 
5.1 Fuel Price Higher  fuel  taxes are one policy option  for reducing automotive  fuel consumption, and  are  capable  of  eliciting  a  full  range  of  responses  from  manufacturers  and consumers.  Higher  fuel  taxes  would  motivate  consumers  to  choose  vehicles  that consume  less  fuel,  and  manufacturers  to  introduce  new  efficiency‐enhancing technologies while placing greater emphasis on reducing fuel consumption. (Evans, 2008)  In  this  section,  the  effect  of  a  sustained  change  in  gasoline  prices  on  the optimal  balance  between  acceleration  and  fuel  consumption  is  evaluated  for  U.S. cars, using the technology allocation model described in the preceding chapters. The modeled  fuel  consumption  and  ERFC  levels  are  compared with  observed ERFC  in Europe,  and  with  fuel  consumption  calculated  based  on  published  values  of elasticity of fuel consumption with respect to fuel price. Finally, the effect of higher gasoline prices on consumers’ overall value of technology is examined. 
5.1.1 Modeled Response to Fuel Price Changes The  long‐term,  optimal  allocation  of  technologies  to  acceleration  and  fuel consumption improvements was modeled by assuming that consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for fuel consumption reductions is directly proportional to the price of fuel,  as explained  in Section 3.3.3. For example,  a permanent, 50%  increase  in  the average gasoline price from $1.70 per gallon to $2.55 per gallon would be assumed to increase consumers WTP for fuel consumption improvements from $430 to $650 per (1l/100km) reduction, over the long term.  The model results indicate that the optimal balance between performance and fuel consumption is quite sensitive to fuel price. Figure 5‐1 shows the optimal emphasis on reducing fuel consumption for the average U.S. car between 2005 and 2020, as a function of gasoline price. It bears repeating that this optimal value represents the 
 68 
allocation of technologies that would maximize revenues for manufacturers in 2020, based  on  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  acceleration  and  fuel  consumption improvements.  The  solid  curve,  corresponding  to  the  baseline  scenario,  passes through  the  point  ($1.70,  8%).  This  represents  the  baseline,  constant  fuel  price scenario presented in Chapter 4. Also shown are the dashed curves representing the sensitivity cases of higher and lower WTP for acceleration. The results suggest that a sustained increase in the price of gasoline to $2.75 per gallon would make an ERFC of 100% optimal through 2020. In the sensitivity case for high WTP for acceleration, a  fuel  price  of  $3.30  per  gallon  is  needed  to  motivate  100%  ERFC,  because  the higher  WTP  for  acceleration  tends  to  increase  the  opportunity  cost  of  foregone performance improvements.  
 
Figure 5­1: Optimal values of emphasis on reducing fuel consumption (ERFC) between 2005 and  2020,  as  a  function  of  long‐term  fuel  price.  ERFC  is  measured  relative  to  initial  fuel consumption  and  acceleration  in  2005.  Solid  curve  represents  baseline  scenario  (WTP  for acceleration  =  $570/second).  Dotted  curves  represent  sensitivity  cases  (WTP  for acceleration 20% higher and 20% lower than baseline). As fuel price  increases,  the optimal ERFC becomes less sensitive to  fuel price. This follows  from  the  nature  of  the  technical  tradeoff  between  acceleration  and  fuel consumption.  As  shown  in  ,  the  curvature  of  the  acceleration‐fuel  consumption tradeoff curve dictates that as fuel consumption decreases, further reductions in fuel 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consumption demand progressively greater marginal sacrifices in acceleration. As a result,  the  marginal  “opportunity  cost”  of  foregone  acceleration  increases  as  fuel consumption decreases, and so larger marginal increases in fuel price are needed to drive continued increases in ERFC. 
5.1.2 Comparison of Results with European ERFC Despite  higher  gasoline  prices  in  Europe,  the  emphasis  on  reducing  fuel consumption there has not been as high as the results predicted by the technology allocation model  and presented  in  the preceding  section. Gasoline prices  in major European countries averaged between $4.00 and $5.00 per gallon (2007 U.S. dollars per U.S. gallon) between 1990 and 2003, and increased to $6.00‐$6.50 per gallon by 2006.  (Energy  Information  Administration,  )  During  this  period,  emphasis  on reducing fuel consumption was found to be in the range of 50%‐80% for gasoline‐fueled vehicles. (Cheah et al., 2008) This indicates that the results of the technology allocation  model,  which  suggest  that  100%  ERFC  would  result  from  a  sustained gasoline price of just $2.75 per gallon, demand closer scrutiny. There  are  two  principal  reasons  that  the  optimal  ERFC  calculated  for  U.S.  cars through 2020 is higher than the ERFC historically observed in Europe at comparable fuel prices. First, vehicles are driven fewer kilometers per year in Europe than in the U.S., leading to a lower WTP for fuel consumption at a given fuel price. Second, the calculation  of  ERFC  is  dependent  upon  the  initial  levels  of  acceleration  and  fuel consumption, which are different in Europe and the U.S.  New  car  buyers  in  Europe  would  be  expected  to  have  a  lower  WTP  for  fuel consumption that U.S. consumers at the same fuel price, because new cars in Europe are driven significantly less in their first few years on the road than those in the U.S. Between  1995  and  2006,  the  average  new  gasoline‐fueled  vehicle  in  four  major European countries was driven between 15,000 and 20,000 km annually in its first three  years  on  the  road.  (Bodek  &  Heywood,  2008;  Bodek,  2008)  This  is approximately 20%‐40% less than the average vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT) by 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a new car in the U.S. over its first 3 years (see Section 3.3.3). The lower VKT can be expected  to  reduce  consumers  WTP  for  fuel  consumption  reductions,  partially offsetting  the  effects  of  Europe’s  higher  fuel  prices.  Table  5‐1  summarizes  the average VKT over the first three years, average gasoline prices, and corresponding WTP for fuel consumption as calculated by Equation 3‐10, for four major European countries.  
Table  5­1: Average  gasoline  prices  and  annual  VKT  for  new  cars  in  four major  European countries, 1995‐2003. WTP for fuel consumption is expressed on the basis of U.S. unadjusted fuel consumption measurements, assuming WTP is equivalent to a 3‐year payback. Average VKT  are  from  (Bodek  &  Heywood,  2008;  Bodek,  2008).  Gasoline  prices  are  reported  in nominal  U.S.  dollars  by  (Energy  Information  Administration,  )  and  are  adjusted  to  2007 dollars using consumer price index data for the respective countries. (Centro diffusione dati, 2009; Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, 2009; Office for National Statistics, 2009; Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, 2009) 
 Time Period Average 
VKT per year 
First 3 years 
Average 
Gasoline Price 
$ / US Gallon 
WTP for 
Fuel Consumption 
$ per (l/100km) 
France 1995-2003 15,500 $4.50 $740 
Germany 1995-2003 15,800 $4.20 $700 
UK 1995-2001 19,800 $4.50 $940 
Italy 1995-2001 14,600 $4.60 $710 Europeans’ estimated willingness to pay for fuel consumption reductions at gasoline prices  of  $4.00‐$5.00 per  gallon  is  comparable  to  that  of Americans  at  prices  less than $3.00 per gallon. With the exception of the UK, the WTP for fuel consumption reductions  is  estimated  to  be  between  $700  and  $740  per  (1l/100km)  in  the countries  listed.  If  the WTP increased proportionately with gasoline price, without the moderating effects of lower VKT, WTP in the European countries would actually be closer  to $1,100 per  (1l/100km). Put another way,  the range of $700‐$740 per (1l/100km)  is  equivalent  to  the WTP  for  fuel  consumption  expected  for  U.S.  car buyers at a gasoline price of $2.70‐$2.90 per gallon and U.S. VKT levels. 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The  second  reason  that  the model  finds  optimal  ERFC  values  for  U.S.  cars  higher than  those  found  in  Europe  for  the  same  fuel  price  is  that  European  cars  already have lower fuel consumption than U.S. cars, which reduces the calculated ERFC even if  the  final  fuel  consumption  is  the  same.  This  is  best  understood  by  referring  to Figure 5‐2 and Figure 5‐3, and is explained in the following paragraphs. Table 5‐2 summarizes the average fuel consumption of news cars sold in four major European countries in 1995, as measured on the New European Drive Cycle (NEDC). Because  of  differences  in  the  details  of  the  test  cycle,  the NEDC  generally  returns higher fuel consumption figures than the U.S. CAFE test cycle (i.e. the U.S. unadjusted laboratory  fuel  consumption  figures  used  elsewhere  in  this work).  The NEDC  fuel consumption  figures  were  converted  into  U.S.  equivalent  fuel  consumption  by multiplying by 1.13. (An & Sauer, 2004) 
Table 5­2: Average fuel consumption of new cars in major European countries in 1995, and observed  emphasis  on  reducing  fuel  consumption  post‐1995.  Fuel  consumption  rates expressed  on  the  New  European  Drive  Cycle  (NEDC)  were  converted  to  U.S.  CAFE‐cycle equivalent by dividing by 1.13. (An & Sauer, 2004; European Commission, 2007) 
 Time Period 1995 NEDC fuel 
consumption 
(l/100km) 




France 1995-2003 7.5 6.6 54% 
Germany 1995-2003 8.2 7.3 51% 
UK 1995-2001 8.1 7.2 48% 
Italy 1995-2001 7.5 6.6 82% 











Figure  5­2:  Optimal  Acceleration,  fuel  consumption,  and  ERFC  for  U.S.  cars  in  2020, assuming WTP  for  fuel  consumption = $720 per  (1l/100km), WTP  for acceleration = $570 per second, starting from 8.0 l/100km in 2005. 
 
Figure  5­3:  Optimal  acceleration,  fuel  consumption,  and  ERFC  for  U.S.  cars  in  2020, assuming WTP  for  fuel  consumption = $720 per  (1l/100km), WTP  for acceleration = $570 per second, starting from 6.9 l/100km in 2005. 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5.1.3 Comparison of Results with Elasticity-based Calculations The response of average vehicle fuel consumption to a change in fuel price is often characterized using an elasticity – that is, the fractional change in fuel consumption resulting from a certain fractional change in fuel price. The response to an increase in fuel price can be expected to include a shift toward greater emphasis on reducing fuel consumption, more rapid adoption of efficiency‐enhancing technologies, and a shift toward classes of vehicles that consume less fuel (i.e. from light trucks to cars, from  larger  cars  to  smaller  cars).  (Evans,  2008)  Calculations  based  on  published estimates of elasticity therefore provide a useful comparison for the modeled effect of fuel price changes on ERFC. The  technology  allocation  model  predicts  a  stronger  response  to  changes  in  fuel price than that suggested by elasticity calculations using typical values of elasticity. Evans  (2008)  reviewed  a  range  of  published  estimates  of  elasticity  of  fuel consumption  with  respect  to  fuel  price  and  settled  on  a  long‐run  value  of  ‐0.33, while evaluating a range from ‐0.17 to ‐0.50. Figure 5‐4 compares the optimal fuel consumption values calculated by the model with the fuel consumption as calculated based  on  an  elasticity  value  of  ‐0.33.  The model’s  response  is  actually  consistent with  an  elasticity  value  of  ‐0.53,  close  to  the  “more  responsive”  end  of  the  range investigated  by  Evans.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  elasticity‐based  curve  in Figure 5‐4 represents the overall response of new vehicle fuel consumption, due to shifts  in  ERFC,  technology  adoption,  and  vehicle  size.  Therefore,  it  would  be expected that the shift in ERFC accounts for only part of the response predicted by the elasticity calculation. 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Figure 5­4: Comparison of optimal  fuel consumption for U.S. cars  in 2020 as calculated by technology allocation model with fuel consumption calculated by assuming elasticity of fuel consumption with respect to price = ‐0.33. There are several explanations that may account for the modeled ERFC being higher than the aggregate response based on published elasticities. First, it is possible that consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  fuel  consumption  does  not  increase proportionally with  fuel price.  If WTP for  fuel consumption  increased by  less  than the  increase  in  fuel  price,  then  the  effect  of  a  change  in  fuel  price  on  fuel consumption  (and  ERFC) would  be  reduced,  and  the modeled  response  curves  in Figure 5‐1 and Figure 5‐4 would be less steep. Second, it is possible that consumers’ WTP  for  acceleration  is  not  constant,  meaning  that  consumers’  total  value  from acceleration is not linear with respect to the change in acceleration. If reductions in 0‐60  mph  time  produced  diminishing  returns  in  consumer  value,  it  would  be expected  that  the  marginal  cost  of  foregone  acceleration  would  increase  as  0‐60 mph  times  decreased.  This  would  mean  that  the  cost  of  de‐emphasizing performance  would  increase,  which  would  lead  to  a  smaller  fuel  consumption response  to  changes  in  fuel  price.  Finally,  it  is  possible  that  the  performance‐fuel consumption  tradeoff  curves  used  in  this  work  are  inconsistent  with  the  historic technical  tradeoffs  that  are  embedded  in  any  study  of  observed  elasticity.  This 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would  mean  that  the  sensitivity  of  the  model  to  changes  in  fuel  price  could  be different  than  that  which  has  taken  place  historically.  This  suggests  that  careful study  of  both  historic  and  projected  performance‐fuel  consumption  tradeoffs  are important to the reliability of results. 
5.1.4 Effect of Fuel Price on Consumers’ Value of Technology Increasing  fuel  price  increases  consumers’  WTP  for  fuel  consumption improvements,  but  does  not  diminish  their  WTP  for  acceleration  improvements. Figure  5‐5  plots  the  increase  in  consumer  value  due  to  improvements  in acceleration  and  fuel  consumption  (between  2005  and  2020)  as  a  function  of gasoline price. At a gasoline price of $1.70 per gallon (baseline scenario conditions), the total value increase is just over $1,000, assuming a WTP for acceleration of $570 per  1‐second  reduction  in  0‐60  mph  time.  This  is  chiefly  due  to  reductions  in acceleration time, as shown in Table 4‐1 and the accompanying discussion. As fuel price rises, the optimal balance between acceleration and fuel consumption shifts in favor  of  lower  fuel  consumption  (Figure  5‐1).  As  greater  emphasis  is  placed  on reducing fuel consumption, the value to consumers of fuel consumption reductions increases  while  the  value  of  acceleration  improvements  decreases.  At  fuel  prices greater than $2.75 per gallon, the optimal ERFC is greater than 100%, meaning that the optimal 0‐60 mph time in 2020 is greater than its 2005 level. This decrease in acceleration performance is reflected by the value of acceleration changes becoming negative. Similarly, at fuel prices less than $1.65, the optimal ERFC is less than zero, meaning that the optimal fuel consumption is worse in 2020 than in 2005. The value of fuel consumption changes thus becomes negative. 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Figure  5­5:  Increase  in  consumers'  value  of  U.S.  cars  between  2005  and  2020  due  to improvements in fuel consumption and acceleration, as a function of gasoline price. Assumes WTP for acceleration = $570 per second in 2020, and WTP for fuel consumption reductions is proportional to gasoline price (and equal to $430 per (1l/100km) when gasoline price = $1.70 per gallon). Value reflects the optimal allocation of technology to performance and fuel consumption for each gasoline price. An  important  feature  of  Figure  5‐5  is  the  upward‐curving  shape  of  the  fuel consumption  value  curve.  This  may  at  first  come  as  a  surprise  since  fuel consumption  is expected  to change more slowly at higher  fuel prices, as shown  in Figure 5‐4. However, there are two factors driving the value of fuel consumption at higher  fuel  prices.  First,  there  is  the  direct  effect  of  gasoline  prices  motivating greater reductions in fuel consumption. This is then compounded by the increasing WTP for this better fuel consumption, which itself increases proportionally with fuel price. This behavior  is  reflected by Equation 3‐2  and Equation 3‐10, which define the value increase due to fuel consumption reductions.  Perhaps the most interesting conclusion that can be drawn from Figure 5‐5 is that higher  gasoline  prices  not  only  motivate  greater  emphasis  on  reducing  fuel consumption, but make auto manufacturers’ technology considerably more valuable to consumers.  Increasing the gasoline price to $3.00 would  increase the value that 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consumers  place  on  expected  new  efficiency‐enhancing  technologies  by  almost $500, or more  than 40%,  in 2020. First, by making  the  technology more valuable, higher  fuel prices  increase  the  economic  incentive  for  automakers  to develop and deploy more advanced technologies. Over the long term, this would be expected to increase the overall rate of technological improvement in the auto industry. A second important insight is that higher fuel prices over the medium to long term may be  beneficial  to  the  auto  industry.  This  is  a  counterintuitive  result,  given  the popular view that high gasoline prices have exacerbated the recent problems faced by  the  auto  industry  (particularly  the  Detroit  companies).  However,  the  key distinction here is between the short‐term effects of fuel prices and the medium‐ to long‐term  effects.  In  the  short  term,  manufacturers  can  respond  to  shifts  in  fuel price  mainly  by  adjusting  prices  and  the  mix  of  their  existing  product  line.  This deviation  from  their  existing  product  plan  can  be  costly.  In  the  medium  term, however,  manufacturers  can  re‐optimize  their  allocation  of  technologies  to  place greater emphasis on reducing fuel consumption, and in the long term they can ramp up their deployment of technologies. (Klier & Linn, 2008) This observation can also be  viewed  in  an  economic  sense,  considering  efficiency  technologies  and  fuels  as substitutable.  As  the  price  of  fuel  rises,  consumers  can  purchase  more  efficiency technologies in order to be able to meet their mobility demands with less fuel. At the same  time,  higher  prices  of  fuel  drive  higher  prices  for  the  substitute:  advanced technology.11 The  above  observations  may  help  to  explain  why  the  auto  industry  and  its supporters are so enthusiastic about using gasoline taxes to drive improvements in 
                                                        
11 An additional effect of higher  fuel prices  is a reduction  in VKT (Evans, 2008). Lower annual VKT would be expected to extend the lifetime of vehicles, and therefore could have the effect of reducing sales volume, which would not be good for auto manufacturers. If an increase in gasoline price from $1.70 to $3.00 per gallon (a 76% increase) would reduce fuel consumption by 26% (Figure 5‐4), then the fuel cost per kilometer would increase by 30%. Evans assumed an elasticity of VKT with respect to  the  fuel  cost  per  kilometer  of  ‐0.1,  which  suggests  a  decrease  in  VKT  of  less  than  3%  for  new vehicles.  If VKT  for new vehicles decreases by  less  than 3%,  then  the  reduction  in  sales  should be commensurately small as well. 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fuel  consumption.  (Garthwaite,  2009;  Lopez,  2009;  Murphy,  2008)  This  analysis shows  that  gasoline  taxes  are  far  from  a  neutral  policy  from  the  perspective  of automakers. To the contrary, increasing the price of fuel increases the value of one of the auto industry’s key assets and capabilities: the development and deployment of advanced technology. 
5.2 Incentives to Influence ERFC Incentives or disincentives linked to the fuel consumption or performance attributes of a vehicle provide an alternative means of influencing manufacturers’ decisions on the allocation of technologies to these attributes. In this section, the incorporation of incentive systems into the technology allocation model is described, and the effects of  different  incentive  systems  on  the  performance‐fuel  consumption  tradeoff  are evaluated. 
5.2.1 Modeling of Incentives In this section, the incorporation of a fuel consumption incentive into the technology allocation model is described. The logic and equations behind the incorporation of a performance‐focused  incentive  system  are  similar,  but  are  not  provided  here. Equation  5‐3  shows  how  an  incentive  amount  would  be  calculated  for  a  linear (constant‐rate)  fuel  consumption  incentive.  IFC  represents  the  incentive  amount, with positive  values  of  IFC  corresponding  to  a  reward being paid.  The  incentive  is linear  with  respect  to  fuel  consumption,  with  rate  rFC,  and  FCP  denotes  the  pivot point fuel consumption level. 
Equation 5­3 
 The incentive amount can be added to the inherent value that consumers place on the  improvements  in  the  vehicle,  as  calculated  according  to  Equation  3‐2.  In  this way  an  incentive‐adjusted  value  to  consumers  can  be  calculated,  as  shown  by Equation 5‐4. 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Equation 5­4 
 By  using  the  expression  in  Equation  5‐4  and  substituting  into  Equation  3‐1,  it  is possible  to  solve  for  the  optimal  fuel  consumption  level,  as  was  done  in  Section 3.2.3.  In  this  way,  it  can  be  shown  that  the  optimal  fuel  consumption  under  an incentive  program  is  given  by  the  following  equation,  in  which  p  and  q  are  as defined in Chapter 3: 
Equation 5­5 
 
Equation 5‐5 reveals an important property of a linear incentive system: the optimal allocation  of  technologies  to  performance  and  fuel  consumption  depends  on  the incentive rate, but not on the pivot point. This  is because the optimal allocation of technologies depends on the derivative of the incentive amount with respect to the attribute of interest. For linear incentive systems, this is equal to the incentive rate. The  implication  of  this  is  that  penalty‐based,  reward‐based,  and  mixed  incentive system should  all  be  equally  effective  for  influencing ERFC;  all  that matters  is  the incentive  rate. Greene et  al.  have  confirmed  that  for  a  system  in which a  constant incentive  rate  is  applied  to  all  vehicles,  the  selection  of  the  pivot  point  does  not affect the resulting fuel economy level. (Greene et al., 2005) The  incentive  pivot  point  does  have  important  consequences.  First,  as  shown  in Equation  5‐3,  the  incentive  amount  for  a  given  vehicle  is  proportional  to  the difference between  the pivot point and  the vehicle’s  fuel  consumption. The higher the pivot point is, the larger is the reward (or smaller the penalty) on each vehicle. Systems  that  emphasize  rewards over penalties,  by having pivot points  above  the average  fuel  consumption,  will  effectively  subsidize  industry  by  paying  out  more than they collect. On the other hand, penalty‐focused incentive programs, with low 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pivot points, would effectively  tax  the automotive market by  collecting more  than they pay out. Revenue‐neutral systems would neither tax nor subsidize industry. A final important point is that in a revenue‐neutral system with a constant feebate rate, the pivot point must be equal to the average fuel consumption, by definition. (If it did not, the system could not be revenue‐neutral.) If the pivot point is equal to the average  fuel  consumption,  then  the  average  incentive  amount  is  zero,  and  so  the incentive adds no value  for the average consumer. This  is apparent  from Equation 5‐4. Put another way, under a  revenue‐neutral  incentive  system, each vehicle  that benefits from a reward must be balanced out by a vehicle that is charged a penalty. Therefore,  the  benefits  to  one  consumer  must  be  offset  by  losses  from  another consumer(s).12  
5.2.2 Fuel Consumption Incentives The effect of a fuel consumption incentive program on the average fuel consumption of new U.S. cars was modeled by adding the  incentive rate  to consumers’ WTP for fuel  consumption and  solving  for optimal  fuel  consumption according  to Equation 5‐5. The optimal ERFC values obtained are plotted as a function of incentive rate in Figure 5‐6,  for  a  constant  gasoline price of  $1.70. When  the  incentive  rate  is  zero (the  baseline  scenario),  the  optimal  ERFC  is  8%,  as  discussed  in  the  preceding chapter. The optimal ERFC increases rapidly with incentive rate, reaching 100% for an incentive rate of $275 per (1l/100km).  The incentive rate needed to motivate 100% ERFC for new U.S. cars through 2020 is considerably  less  than  the  incentive  rate  employed  in  the  U.S.  gas  guzzler  tax (approximately  $730  per  (1l/100km)),  or  the  feebate  system  recently  adopted  in France (equivalent to approximately $650 per (1l/100km) on the U.S. CAFE cycle).                                                         
12 In reality, if incentive rates or pivot points are set in advance, it is extremely unlikely that the fees collected will perfectly offset the rebates. Even in a system intended to be revenue‐neutral, there will be too many uncertainties for policymakers to predict in advance the exact mix of vehicles that will be  sold.  However,  it  is  assumed  that  over  time,  policymakers  will  be  able  to  make  reasonably accurate predictions, informed by past experience with the system. 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The incentive rate needed to motivate 100% ERFC is in fact closer to the stringency of  the  CO2‐based  tax  policies  in  Germany  and  the  U.K.,  assuming  a  three‐year valuation of ownership  taxes.  (see Chapter 2  for an analysis of  the  stringencies of current fuel consumption and CO2 policies in the U.S. and Europe) This suggests that the feebate rates currently in use should be more than adequate to motivate 100% ERFC. However, the U.S. gas guzzler tax applies only to cars with fuel consumption greater than 10.5 l/100km (i.e. fuel economy less than 22.5 mpg). (U.S. EPA, 2006) The French feebate system is based on a series of bins, so the effective marginal rate will vary from zero to very large, depending on a vehicle’s fuel consumption relative to  the  bin  boundary.  Because  neither  system  provides  a  uniform,  constant‐rate incentive,  they  do  not  affect  all  vehicles  in  the  same way  and will  not  deliver  the most cost‐effective reductions according to the equimarginal principle. (Field, 1994) 
 
Figure 5­6: Optimal values of emphasis on reducing fuel consumption (ERFC) in 2020, as a function  of  fuel  consumption  incentive  rate.  ERFC  is  measured  relative  to  initial  fuel consumption  and  acceleration  in  2005.  Solid  curve  represents  baseline  scenario  (WTP  for acceleration  =  $570/second).  Dotted  curves  represent  sensitivity  cases  (WTP  for acceleration  20%  higher  and  20%  lower  than  baseline).  Gasoline  price  is  assumed  to  be constant  at  $1.70  per  gallon,  and  consumers’ WTP  for  fuel  consumption  is  assumed  to  be constant at $430 per (1l/100km) in all cases. 
  83 
Recently, preliminary data have indicated a shift in trends in the French car market since the bonus‐malus system was introduced. In 2008, the average new car sold in France was reportedly 2 cm shorter than in the year prior, with a 3% reduction in weight and a 3.5% reduction  in power. Also,  the average price dropped by nearly €2,700. These shifts were attributed to the combination of the bonus‐malus system and high  fuel prices.  (Navarro, 2009) More  time and data will  likely be needed  to disentangle  the  effects  of  the bonus‐malus  system, high  fuel  prices,  and  a  slowing economy on the car market. However, it is worth noting that these findings are not inconsistent with the results reported here. Greene et al. evaluated the effect of feebate systems on new vehicle fuel economy at rates  of  $210  and  $425  per  (1l/100km),  using  a  technology  adoption  framework. (Greene et al., 2005) Their key results are summarized in Table 5‐3 and compared with  the  results  predicted  by  the  technology  allocation  model.  Evans  (2008) reviewed a number of other studies of feebates and found that they reported results generally similar to those of Greene et al. The  technology  allocation  model  predicts  a  significantly  larger  fuel  consumption response  than  was  reported  in  Greene.  This  is  likely  due  to  the  difference  in modeling approaches. Whereas Greene et al. employ a technology adoption model, in which they hold constant all vehicle attributes other than fuel consumption and price, the technology allocation model takes a certain level of technology as given. In the scenario of a $425 per (1l/100km) incentive rate, the fuel consumption figures predicted by Greene et  al.  correspond  to an  increase of 25%  in performance‐size‐fuel  economy  index  over  10‐15  years,  and  considerably  less  under  the  lower‐rate scenario (assuming, as Greene et al. do, that size and performance remain constant). In comparison, the present work assumes an increase in PSFI of 32% over 15 years, regardless of the incentive rate. 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Table  5­3:  Comparison  of  modeled  effects  of  fuel  consumption  incentives  with  results reported  by  Greene  et  al.  (2005).  Incentive  rates  have  been  converted  to  2007  dollars. (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008) 
 Greene et al. (2005) Technology Allocation 
Model 
Base Year Fuel Cons. 
(l/100km) 
8.3 8.0 
Future Fuel Cons. (l/100km) 
No Policy 
8.3 7.8 
Future Fuel Cons. (l/100km) 
(% reduction vs. No Policy) 





Future Fuel Cons. (l/100km) 
(% reduction vs. No Policy) 










several European countries would  impose  incentive  rates much higher  than  those examined  here  and  presented  in  Figure  5‐7,  ranging  from  $500  to  $4,000  per marginal 1‐second reduction in 0‐60 mph time for the average new U.S. car. If the goal of  imposing an incentive program is purely to reduce fuel consumption, then targeting the incentive on moderating performance is an inferior approach to imposing  a  fuel  consumption  incentive.  Incentives  targeting  fuel  consumption directly  would  be  expected  to  elicit  all  manner  of  responses  that  reduce  fuel consumption,  including  increasing  ERFC,  ramping  up  technology  adoption,  and shifting toward smaller vehicles. On the other hand, a policy aimed at discouraging performance  increases would only  indirectly  influence  fuel  consumption, and only through one of these responses (increasing ERFC).  
 
Figure 5­7: Optimal values of emphasis on reducing fuel consumption (ERFC) in 2020, as a function  of  acceleration  disincentive  rate.  ERFC  is  measured  relative  to  initial  fuel consumption  and  acceleration  in  2005.  Solid  curve  represents  baseline  scenario  (WTP  for acceleration  =  $570/second).  Dotted  curves  represent  sensitivity  cases  (WTP  for acceleration  20%  higher  and  20%  lower  than  baseline).  Gasoline  price  is  assumed  to  be constant  at  $1.70  per  gallon,  and  consumers’ WTP  for  fuel  consumption  is  assumed  to  be constant at $430 per (1l/100km) in all cases. A  further  problem  with  performance  disincentives  is  the  practical  feasibility  of implementing them. Acceleration time is the performance metric used here, but it is 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far  from  being  the  only  metric  available.  It  is  more  likely  that  that  some performance‐related attribute such as power or power/weight ratio would be made the  target  of  the  incentive  program,  as  is  done  in many  European  countries  (and discussed in Chapter 2). This would open the door to more problems, however. For example, if a displacement‐based incentive program were developed, manufacturers might simply turn to turbocharging to increase vehicle performance while keeping engine size  low. Or,  if a horsepower‐based  incentive were adopted, manufacturers might  switch  to  diesel  engines,  in  order  to  obtain  superior  torque while  reducing peak power. In neither case would the manufacturer have an incentive to emphasize lower fuel consumption in their new designs.  None  of  the  preceding  discussion  is  meant  to  imply  that  reducing  vehicle performance  is an  inherently unworthy goal  in  its own right.  Indeed,  it  is possible that there would be safety benefits from moderating the performance capabilities of future  cars.  If  this  were  considered  a  policy  priority,  then  policies  addressing performance directly might be appropriate. However, if the goal of policymaking is to  reduce  fuel  consumption,  then  this  goal  can  be  most  effectively  served  by incentives focused more directly to fuel consumption. 
5.3 Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards Corporate  Average  Fuel  Economy  (CAFE)  standards  can  increase  ERFC  by mandating  that  the  average  fuel  economy  of  the  fleet  of  vehicles  sold  by  each manufacturer  meet  at  least  a  prescribed  minimum  (i.e.  the  standards  prescribe maximum  levels  of  average  fuel  consumption).  Because  CAFE  standards  do  not increase  the  price  of  fuel,  or  impose  an  explicit  price  signal  on  fuel  consumption, they  do  not  affect  the  revenue‐maximizing  allocation  of  technology  between performance and  fuel  consumption.  Instead,  they  simply  compel manufacturers  to produce  a  fleet  of  vehicles with  characteristics  that  deviate  from  the unregulated, revenue‐maximizing  characteristics.  Therefore,  one  way  to  estimate  the  cost  of  a CAFE standard is to measure the difference between the maximized (optimal) value 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reduction  increases proportionately. However,  increased ERFC also means smaller reductions  in  acceleration  times,  so  the  value  of  acceleration  declines  as  ERFC increases. An ERFC of zero indicates no improvement in fuel consumption over time, so  the  value  of  fuel  consumption  improvements  is  zero  and  the  net  value  to consumers is equal to the value of acceleration improvements. On the other hand, an ERFC of 100% represents the case in which there is no change in acceleration, so the value  of  acceleration  improvements  is  zero,  and  the  net  value  increase  is  due entirely to the improvement in fuel consumption.  
 
Figure  5­8:  Consumers’  value  of  fuel  consumption  and  acceleration  improvements  as  a function  of  ERFC. WTP  for  fuel  consumption  improvements  is  assumed  to  be  constant  at $430 per (1l/100km) reduction, and WTP for acceleration is assumed to be constant at $570 per 1‐second reduction in 0‐60 mph time. Figure 5‐8  suggests  that  if  the CAFE standard were met entirely by  shifting ERFC, the  cost  imposed  by  the  standard  would  be  on  the  order  of  $200  per  car,  when averaged  across  the  entire  fleet  of  new  cars.  Point  ‘A’  marks  the  optimum  ERFC under  the  baseline  scenario  conditions,  for  which  the  increase  in  consumers’ combined  value  of  acceleration  and  fuel  consumption  is  maximized  (ERFC  =  8%, total value = $1,050). If the CAFE standard of 6.0 l/100km in 2020 were met entirely 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by  trading  off  performance  (rather  than  through  additional  technology introductions  or  downsizing  of  vehicles),  an  ERFC  of  100%  would  be  needed between 2005 and 2020 (as discussed  in  the preceding paragraphs and shown by Figure  3‐5).  Consumers’  value  of  performance  and  fuel  consumption  in  this  case would be represented by point ‘B’ in Figure 5‐8 (100%, $840). Although consumers do value  the  fuel consumption reductions,  the value of acceleration  improvements declines more rapidly, leading to a reduction in net decrease in value to consumers. The value that consumers place on the reduction in fuel consumption at point ‘B’ is $840 under baseline assumptions, or roughly $200 less than the value they place on combined  improvements  in  performance  and  fuel  consumption  at  the  optimum ERFC of 8%.  The estimated cost of  just over $200 per car for meeting the CAFE standard of 6.0 l/100km (39 mpg) in 2020 is substantially less than many estimates that have been reported publicly. For example, General Motors’ Vice Chairman, Bob Lutz, predicted in 2008 that GM would spend an average of $6,000 per vehicle to meet the 35 mpg combined  car/truck  standard.  (Murphy,  2008)  The  consulting  company  Global Insight  estimated  the  cumulative  cost  at  $46  billion  through  2015  for  the  top  six companies  in  the  U.S.  market  (equivalent  to  approximately  $600  per  vehicle, assuming 15 million vehicles sold per year over 5 years), and pegged the expected increase  in  sticker  prices  at  5‐15%  in  2020.  (Greimel,  2008;  Squatriglia,  2007) Based on  the  average base MSRP of  $22,000  for new cars  in 2008  (Ward's,  2007; Ward's,  2008; Ward's,  2009),  a  5‐15%  increase  would  be  approximately  $1,100‐$3,300.  The  National  Highway  Traffic  Safety  Administration,  responsible  for implementing  CAFE  standards,  estimated  a  price  increase  of  $650  per  car  just  to meet its proposed standard of 6.8 l/100km (34.7 mpg) in 2015. (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2008)  The  large  difference  in  cost  estimates  is  due  to  the  way  in  which  technology decisions are modeled and the way in which costs are measured, which combine to significantly overstate  the  true  costs of  the  regulations. All  of  the above estimates 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rely on a “technology adoption” framework, in which vehicle size and performance are  set  exogenously  and held  constant while  additional  technologies  are  added  in order  to  reduce  fuel  consumption.15 The corresponding  increase  in  retail prices  is then reported as the cost of complying with the regulation. Although this is one way to  define  “cost,”  it  overlooks  the  possibility  of  trading  off  performance  for improvements  in  fuel  consumption,  with  no  change  in  the  normal  pattern  of technology  adoption.  A more  realistic  assessment  of  the  cost  to manufacturers  is obtained by measuring the difference between the revenues that can be realized in the absence of regulation, and the revenues  that can be realized by employing  the same  suite  of  technologies  (at  the  same  manufacturing  cost)  in  the  presence  of regulation.  Because  consumers  do  place  some  value  on  reductions  in  fuel consumption, manufacturers are able  to  recoup most of prospective  revenues  lost through  foregone  performance,  especially  for  modest  reallocations  of  technology from offsetting performance increases to reducing fuel consumption. Although CAFE standards do  impose  real  costs  on manufacturers,  the  true  costs  are  substantially lower than those commonly reported.  
5.4 Technology Development and Deployment Incentives So  far,  the  analysis  and  discussion  in  this  chapter  have  focused  on  policies  that would  shift  the  allocation  of  efficiency‐enhancing  technologies  in  cars  toward greater  emphasis  on  reducing  fuel  consumption,  while  assuming  that  the  overall rate of technological progress is fixed. A somewhat different approach to decreasing automotive  fuel  consumption  is  to  implement policies  intended  to  lower  the costs and accelerate the deployment of more advanced technologies into the new vehicle                                                         
15  In  setting  CAFE  standards,  NHTSA  assumes  certain  costs  and  fuel‐saving  potential  for  each technology,  and  then  adds  technologies  in  order  of  cost‐effectiveness  until  the  marginal  cost  of adding  new  technologies  matches  the  marginal  benefit  they  deliver,  from  a  societal  standpoint. (National  Highway  Traffic  Safety  Administration,  2008)  Global  Insight  concluded  that  to meet  the CAFE standards, "Two‐thirds of the U.S. fleet will have to change to direct injection. One‐third of the total market will be diesel, and half of  those will be diesel‐electric hybrids. Everyone  is pursuing a strategy of  smaller  engines with direct  injection  and  turbochargers."  (Squatriglia,  2007) GM’s Lutz based  his  estimate  of  costs  on  an  assumption  of  “maintaining  the  fleet  mix  basically  as  it  stands today.” (Murphy, 2008) 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fleet.  The  effectiveness  of  such  policies  for  reducing  fuel  consumption  is  wholly dependent  upon  the  decisions  made  by  manufacturers  to  apply  the  new technologies  to  lowering  fuel  consumption or  to offsetting performance  increases.  In this section, the effectiveness of these policies is explored by using the technology allocation model to estimate the allocation of technologies to performance and fuel consumption, under different levels of future technological capability. A variety of policies have been proposed or adopted with the goal of increasing the rate  of  development  and  deployment  of  efficiency‐enhancing  technologies,  or stimulating  the adoption of  leap‐ahead technologies.  In  the 1990s,  the Partnership for  a  New  Generation  of  Vehicles  was  intended  to  facilitate  the  development  of technologies that could triple new vehicle fuel economy while meeting consumers’ and  government  expectations  of  safety,  criteria  pollutant  emissions,  and  price. (Sperling,  2002)  The  energy  bill  passed  by  the  U.S.  Congress  in  2005  included provisions directing the Secretary of Energy to accelerate R&D efforts on batteries, power  electronics,  and other  enabling  technologies  for hybrid  vehicles  (Sec.  711); establishing  a  grant  program  to  support  the  manufacture  of  hybrid  electric  and diesel vehicles in the U.S. (Sec. 712); and establishing a consumer incentive program to  encourage  the  purchase  of  hybrid,  diesel,  and  fuel  cell  vehicles  (Sec.  1341). (Energy Policy Act of 2005, 2005) The 2007 energy bill added loan guarantees  for manufacturers of advanced components and  for batteries, and direct  loans  for  the retooling  of  manufacturing  plants  to  produce  “advanced  technology  vehicles.” (Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 2007) Some of these programs and provisions  have  specifically  linked  eligibility  for  incentives  to  the  production  of vehicles that achieve lower fuel consumption, while others have simply focused on the  development  or  deployment  of  efficiency‐enhancing  technologies  (either evolutionary or revolutionary). A successful policy for accelerating the adoption of more advanced technologies can be modeled in a general way by increasing the rate of growth in the performance‐size‐fuel  economy  index  (PSFI).  This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  5‐9. Historically,  PSFI 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has grown linearly at a rate of 3.5 (hp/lb)(ft3)(mpg) per year. The baseline scenario presented  in  Chapter  4  and  all  of  the  preceding  analyses  in  this  chapter  have assumed continued linear growth in PSFI at the same rate, which yields projections of  future  technological  capabilities  consistent  with  engineering  judgment‐based assessments.  (An  &  DeCicco,  2007;  Cheah  et  al.,  2008)  This  is  illustrated  by  the lower line in Figure 5‐9. The effect of a policy that doubles the rate of technological improvement is represented by the upper, dashed line. 
 
Figure  5­9:  Projected  performance‐size‐fuel  economy  index  (PSFI)  of  new  U.S.  cars,  at growth rates equal to historic trend and at double the historic rate. (An & DeCicco, 2007; U.S. EPA, 2008) It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work  to  evaluate  whether  particular  policies  are actually  capable  of  stimulating  an  increase  in  the  rate  of  new  technology deployment. Rather,  the purpose of  this work  is  simply  to  examine  the effect  that such increases might have on the allocation of technologies to performance and fuel consumption.  In  the  following  paragraphs,  we  explore  these  effects  for  ranges  in growth between 100% and 200% of  the historic growth rate (i.e.  for growth rates bounded by the two lines in Figure 5‐9). 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When  the  rate  of  adoption  of  more  advanced  technologies  is  increased,  both performance and fuel consumption can be expected to improve. Figure 5‐10 shows the  optimal  reductions  in  acceleration  time  and  fuel  consumption  rate  for  the average  new  U.S.  car  between  2005  and  2020,  as  a  function  of  the  rate  of technological  improvement.  The  far  left  of  the  graph  represents  the  baseline scenario,  under which  the  optimal  0‐60 mph  time  is  reduced  from 8.6  seconds  in 2005 to 6.9 seconds in 2020, and the optimal fuel consumption is reduced from 8.0 l/100km to 7.8 l/100km. The far right size of the graph represents the case in which the rate of PSFI growth has been doubled (corresponding to the upper, dashed line in Figure 5‐9). The increasing values for both the improvement in fuel consumption and the improvement in acceleration time indicate that the incremental technology improvements are being split between these two attributes.  
 
Figure 5­10: Optimal  reductions  in  fuel  consumption (unadjusted) and 0‐60 mph  time  for average  new  U.S.  car  in  2020,  relative  to  2005  levels.  As  rate  of  technology  adoption increases,  both  performance  and  fuel  consumption  can  be  expected  to  improve.  Rate  of technological  improvement  is  characterized  by  the  annual  growth  in  PSFI,  indexed  to  the baseline (historic) rate of growth. The optimal value of ERFC is expected to increase modestly as the rate of adoption of more  advanced  technologies  is  increased,  assuming WTP  for  performance  and fuel consumption remain unchanged. As discussed in Chapter 4 and shown in Figure 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5‐11,  the  optimal  ERFC  between  2005  and  2020  under  baseline  conditions, including  historic  rates  of  technology  adoption,  is  8%.  If  the  rate  of  adoption  of efficiency‐enhancing technologies in increased such that PSFI increases at double its historic  rate,  the  overall  ERFC between 2005  and 2020  is  expected  to  increase  to nearly 30%. Although this is greater than under baseline conditions, it indicates that a  majority  of  the  potential  improvement  in  fuel  consumption  would  be  “lost”  to increased performance.  
 
Figure 5­11: Optimal emphasis on reducing fuel consumption increases slightly as the rate of technology adoption (modeled by a faster increase in PSFI) increases. The  finding  that  increasing  the  rate  of  adoption  of  more  advanced  technologies leads  to  improvements  in  both  performance  and  fuel  consumption  has  important consequences  for  policymaking.  If  reducing  fuel  consumption  is  a  policy  goal  but improving vehicle performance  is not,  then policies aimed only at accelerating  the deployment  of more  advanced  technologies  will  not  be  fully  effective.16  Although ERFC  increases  somewhat  as  the  rate  of  technology  adoption  increases,  a  large                                                         
16  The  same  likely  holds  true  for  leap‐ahead  technologies  too  (such  as  hybrids)  as  long  as  the efficiency  improvements  they deliver are readily convertible between  fuel  consumption reductions and performance improvements. 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share  of  the  new  technology  continues  to  be  allocated  to  performance improvements, as shown by the dashed line in Figure 5‐10. If policymakers were to use  government  money  to  accelerate  the  introduction  of  more  advanced technologies,  with  the  goal  of  improving  fuel  consumption,  they  might  be disappointed  to  learn  that  they had effectively  subsidized a  significant  increase  in vehicle performance. If policymakers have a goal of accelerating the deployment of more  advanced  technologies  to  reduce  fuel  consumption,  they  should  couple  any programs  aimed  at  accelerating  technology  adoption  to  complementary  policies aimed  more  directly  at  increasing  ERFC,  like  those  discussed  in  the  preceding sections. 
5.5 Conclusions In  this  chapter,  the  optimal  allocation  of  technologies  to  performance  and  fuel consumption under different policy regimes was investigated. Policies investigated included  raising  gasoline  prices,  purchase  incentives  for  vehicles  with  lower  fuel consumption,  disincentives  for  vehicles  with  higher  performance,  fuel  economy standards, and policies aimed at stimulating technology deployment. Sustained  increases  in  gasoline  prices  are  expected  to  increase  emphasis  on reducing  fuel  consumption  (ERFC)  by  increasing  consumers’  willingness  to  pay (WTP)  for  improvements  in  fuel  consumption.  If  gas  prices  were  to  remain  near $2.00 per gallon instead of returning to their pre‐2003 level of $1.70 per gallon, the optimal ERFC would be expected to increase from less than 10% to approximately 40% for the average new U.S. car through 2020. Sustained prices of $2.75 per gallon would  be  expected  to motivate  a  100% ERFC  through  2020.  Despite  recent  price spikes to well above these levels, ERFC has not increased to the levels predicted by the  model,  because  manufacturers  are  limited  in  their  ability  to  adjust  vehicle designs in the short term.  Higher  gasoline  prices  make  efficiency‐enhancing  technologies  more  valuable  to consumers, as  they seek to substitute vehicle technologies  for  fuel consumption  in 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satisfying their mobility demands. Sustained gasoline prices of $3.00 per gallon are estimated  to  increase  consumers’  value  of  more  advanced  technologies  by approximately $500 for the average new car in the U.S. in 2020. Over the medium to long  term,  higher  gasoline  prices  should  increase  the  incremental  revenues  that manufacturers can derive by deploying more advanced technologies. Incentive  programs  shift  the  optimum  balance  between  performance  and  fuel consumption  by  imposing  a  penalty  for  higher  fuel  consumption  or  performance, and/or  offering  a  reward  for  lower  fuel  consumption  or  performance.  Modeled results  indicate  that  a  100%  ERFC  would  be  motivated  through  2020  by  an incentive rate of  less than $300 per (1l/100km). This  is considerably less than the incentive  rates  already  implemented  through  the  U.S.  gas  guzzler  tax,  and  in France’s new bonus‐malus system, which has reportedly had a significant influence on the French car market in just one year. Fuel economy standards are an effective means for increasing ERFC. A 100% ERFC for new U.S.  cars between 2005 and 2020 would  likely be  adequate  to  satisfy  the requirements of  the Energy  Independence  and Security Act  of  2007  (6.7  l/100km for new cars and light trucks combined). Fuel economy standards do impose costs on manufacturers, but these costs are substantially less than figures commonly cited by  industry,  analysts,  and  in  the  press.  It  is  estimated  that  even  if  gasoline  drops back to $1.70 per gallon, the cost of meeting the CAFE standard through reallocation of  technologies  from  performance  to  fuel  consumption  would  be  approximately $200 per car in 2020. This amount is the difference between the opportunity cost of foregone  performance  and  consumers’  value  of  the  reduced  fuel  consumption.  In contrast,  industry,  analysts,  and  the Department  of  Transportation  frequently  peg the  cost  at  anywhere  from  3  –  30  times  this  figure,  by  failing  to  account  for  the potential  to  reallocate  evolutionary  technologies  to  fuel  consumption  instead  of performance, or for consumers’ willingness to pay for fuel consumption reductions. Policies that focus only on increasing the rate of technological improvement will not deliver  good  “bang  for  the  buck”  in  reducing  fuel  consumption.  Absent 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In  this  work,  a  technology  allocation  model  was  developed  to  assist  in understanding  automobile  manufacturers’  decisions  on  allocating  efficiency‐enhancing technologies between the competing goals of lowering fuel consumption and  offsetting  performance  improvements.  The  model  maximizes  the  value  that consumers will derive from such technologies, based on their willingness to pay for improvements in these two attributes. It is assumed that manufacturers will aspire to maximize the value that their products offer to consumers, in order to maximize their own market share and profits. In other words, the model seeks to identify the optimal balance between performance and  fuel  consumption  from the perspective of the auto manufacturers. The model was calibrated using studies reported in the literature, manufacturers’  price  data,  and  historic  trends  in  performance  and  fuel consumption. In  the  absence of  any policy  intervention or  the  recent  spike  in  gasoline prices,  it would have been reasonable to expect the majority of more advanced technologies to  continue  flowing  toward  offsetting  performance  improvements.  Under  such  a scenario, in which U.S. gasoline prices remained at $1.70 per gallon (they were fairly constant at this level from 1986‐2003, in real terms), it would be expected that the 0‐60 mph  acceleration  time  of  the  average  new U.S.  car would  decrease  from 8.6 seconds  to  6.9  seconds  between  2005  and  2020.  Over  the  same  period,  fuel consumption of the average new U.S. car would drop only slightly, from 8.0 l/100km to  7.8  l/100km.  However,  these  results  are  sensitive  to  consumers’  relative willingness  to  pay  for  improvements  in  performance  and  fuel  consumption,  and average 0‐60 mph times of anywhere between 6.4 and 7.7 seconds could have been reasonably expected in 2020 (corresponding to fuel consumption between 8.6 and 6.9 l/100km). Of course,  there has  in  fact been a recent spike  in gasoline prices and a significant policy intervention in the market. Gasoline prices departed significantly from their 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long‐term averages  beginning  in  2004.  Sustained  increases  in  fuel  price would  be expected to shift  the optimal allocation of  technologies more toward reducing  fuel consumption, because consumers become more willing to pay for reductions in fuel consumption when  fuel  is more  costly.  The  results  of  this work  indicate  that  the optimal  balance  between  performance  and  fuel  consumption  shifts  substantially with  even modest  changes  in  gasoline  price.  If  fuel  prices  stabilized  at  $2.00  per gallon long‐term, instead of their pre‐2004 average of $1.70 per gallon, it would be expected that the average new U.S. car in 2020 would have a 0‐60 mph time of 7.5 seconds,  instead  of  6.9  seconds  (but  still  well  below  the  2005  average  of  8.6 seconds). Fuel consumption of these cars would be expected to average 7.2 l/100km in  this  case,  instead of 7.8  l/100km. Considering even  larger  increases  in gasoline price, a sustained price of $2.75 per gallon would lead to the average 0‐60 mph time in 2020 being the same as  in 2005, with all new efficiency‐enhancing technologies being directed to lowering fuel consumption. Also of note,  increases in gasoline price increase consumers’ willingness to pay for fuel consumption reductions, which increases the total value that consumers place on more advanced technologies. In effect, higher gasoline prices motivate consumer to  seek  substitutes  for  fuel  for meeting  their mobility  needs  and wants,  and  fuel‐saving  technologies are a  substitute  for  fuel. Thus, over  the medium  to  long  term, higher gasoline prices may prove beneficial to the auto industry, as they increase the value of one of the auto industry’s key products: more advanced technologies.  The  second  recent  event  likely  to  influence  the  performance‐fuel  consumption tradeoff is the passage by Congress of increases in Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)  standards,  which  may  impose  modest  costs  on  the  auto  industry.  The industry can be expected to adopt evolutionary  technologies while placing greater emphasis  on  reducing  fuel  consumption  as  part  of  its  strategy  for  meeting  CAFE standards.  The  tradeoff  between  performance  and  fuel  consumption  will  be especially  important  in  the  future,  since  Congress  instructed  the  Department  of Transportation  (DOT)  to  promulgate  attribute‐based  standards.  (Energy 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Independence and Security Act of 2007, 2007) If DOT adopts size‐based standards for  cars,  as  it  did  for  light  trucks  in  2006  (National  Highway  Traffic  Safety Administration, 2006) then the downsizing of vehicles could prove less effective, or indeed  counterproductive,  as  a  CAFE  compliance  strategy.17  However,  if manufacturers  choose  to  sell  vehicles  with  lower  fuel  consumption  and  slower acceleration  than  the  revenue‐maximizing  optimum,  they  will  effectively  be incurring an opportunity cost in the form of the lost performance. (Evans, 2008) The  technology  allocation  model  indicates  that  at  the  pre‐2004  average  gasoline price  of  $1.70  per  gallon,  meeting  the  2020  CAFE  standard  would  reduce  the combined  value  of  performance  and  fuel  consumption  of  the  average  new  car  by approximately  $200  in  2020,  if  manufacturers  complied  with  CAFE  entirely  by trading off performance for fuel consumption. Although consumers’ valuation of fuel consumption would be enhanced by the reduction in fuel consumption, the decline in  consumers’  valuation  of  performance  would  outweigh  this  increase  by approximately $200 for the average new car. Therefore, $200 per car is an estimate of the true cost imposed by the 2020 CAFE standard. Several  points  need  to  be  considered  when  interpreting  the  cost  of  the  CAFE standard. First, although $200 is significant, it is far less than the values frequently offered by the auto industry and DOT, which run into the thousands of dollars per vehicle.  Those  estimates  are  extremely  high  because  they  assume  that  even more costly  advanced  technologies  will  have  to  be  adopted  in  order  to  meet  CAFE standards,  and  they measure  only  the  up‐front  costs  of  these  technologies,  rather than considering how much consumers are willing to pay for fuel consumption and performance. Second, although consumers may be willing to pay only $800 for the reductions  in  fuel  consumption mandated  by  CAFE,  these  reductions will  actually 
                                                        
17  Under  size‐based  CAFE  standards,  manufacturers  that  produce  smaller  vehicles  will  be  held  to higher  CAFE  standards.  Depending  upon  how  quickly  the  CAFE  target  increases  as  vehicle  size decreases, it may be self‐defeating for manufacturers to improve their fuel economy by selling more small vehicles, because doing so would only raise the CAFE standard that they must meet. 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save approximately $1,800 in fuel expenses over the life of an average car.18 Thirdly, increases  in  gasoline  price  reduce  the  opportunity  cost  of  foregone  performance, since  consumers  are  more  willing  to  pay  for  the  mandated  reductions  in  fuel consumption.  A  sustained  gasoline  price  of  $2.00  per  gallon  instead  of  $1.70  per gallon would halve the per‐vehicle cost to $100. Finally, it must be remembered that like many public policies, the CAFE program is concerned not only with the profits of  the  industry  concerned,  but  with  achieving  a  balance  between  a  number  of competing  societal  goals, which  in  the case of CAFE are explicitly  identified  in  the law. (49 U.S.C. 32902(f) )  The  model  was  also  used  to  evaluate  incentive  programs  targeting  either performance  or  fuel  consumption,  both  of  which  were  found  to  be  effective  for shifting  the  balance  between  these  attributes.  Fuel  consumption  incentives considerably  less  stringent  than  those  already  implemented  in  the  U.S.  (the  gas guzzler  tax)  and  in  various  European  countries  (e.g.  the  CO2‐based  bonus‐malus system  adopted  in  France)  were  found  to  motivate  almost  a  full  emphasis  on reducing  fuel  consumption  through  2020,  which  would  see  performance  remain constant and the fuel consumption of the average new U.S. car reduced from 8.0 to 6.0 l/100km. However, these incentives must apply to all vehicles in order for them to be effective. Similarly, existing European policies  targeting engine displacement and power would place a very high price on performance if applied to the average new U.S. car, sufficient to motivate a large swing away from higher performance. The model  results  also  highlight  the  fact  that  a  revenue‐neutral  incentive  system would  have  the  effect  of  decreasing  the  total  value  that  consumers  place  on  the attributes of new cars, on average. Incentive systems effectively put a price on fuel consumption,  shifting  the  optimum balance between  these  attributes.  But  they do 
                                                        
18  For  a  reduction  in  fuel  consumption  from  7.8  l/100km  to  6.0  l/100km.  Assumes  15,600 miles driven in the first year, declining at 4.5% per year, for a 15‐year life. Assumes on‐road fuel economy is  25%  less  than  unadjusted,  laboratory  fuel  economy.  Future  fuel  savings  discounted  at  10% per annum. 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not,  on  average,  increase  the  value  that  consumers  perceive  in  vehicles.  This  is  a result of the revenue‐neutral character of the system: every consumer eligible for a rebate (and thus more willing to pay for a lower‐consuming vehicle) must be offset by another consumer paying a  fee  (who  is  commensurately  less willing  to pay  for that  higher‐consuming  vehicle).  On  net,  therefore,  revenue‐neutral  incentive systems  can  increase  the marginal  value  of  lower  fuel  consumption,  but  decrease the  combined value of performance and  fuel  consumption,  in much  the  same way that CAFE does. This effect could be offset if the incentive system were not revenue‐neutral, and instead more rebates were paid than fees were collected.  The model  helps  to  illuminate  the  different magnitudes  and distributions  of  costs associated with using gas taxes versus CAFE standards to achieve the same shift in ERFC. Higher gas prices may be good for auto manufacturers over the longer term, but  cost  consumers dearly. The model  indicates  that  a  sustained gasoline price of $2.75 per gallon is needed to motivate 100% ERFC (reaching 6.0 l/100km in 2020). Compared with the baseline results (7.8 l/100km in 2020 when gasoline is $1.70), the  higher  gasoline  price  will  lead  to  an  increase  in  lifetime  fuel  expenditures  of nearly  $2,000,  even  after  accounting  for  the  fuel  consumption  response.19  In addition, the consumers will be willing to pay the auto manufacturers roughly $300 more per vehicle for the reduction fuel consumption, which is good for the industry but bad for consumers. In contrast to higher gasoline prices, CAFE standards reduce fuel expenses over the life  of  the  vehicle,  but  impose  costs  at  the  time  of  purchase.  Increasing  ERFC  to 100% to meet CAFE standards imposes an estimated cost of $200 if gasoline prices are averaging $1.70 per gallon, but the standards will reduce fuel expenses by many times this amount over the life of the car.  
                                                        
19  Assumes  15,600  miles  driven  in  the  first  year,  declining  at  4.5%  per  year,  for  a  15‐year  life. Assumes  on‐road  fuel  economy  is  25%  less  than unadjusted,  laboratory  fuel  economy.  Future  fuel savings discounted at 10% per annum. 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The effectiveness of policies aimed at accelerating technology adoption for reducing fuel  consumption was  also  explored  using  the model.  It  was  found  that  although these policies can lead to lower fuel consumption, they can be expected to also lead to  higher  performance,  unless  accompanied  by  policies  that  can  direct  the technology  improvements  toward  lower  fuel  consumption.  In effect,  these policies on  their  own  would  subsidize  an  increase  in  vehicle  performance  in  addition  to come  improvement  in  fuel  consumption,  and  so  may  represent  poor  value  as  a public investment if the goal is to reduce fuel consumption. The  high  sensitivity  of  the  optimal  balance  between  performance  and  fuel consumption  to  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  these  attributes  points  to  two important  lessons  for  automakers.  First,  it  reinforces  the  importance  of manufacturers  staying  abreast  of  their  customers’  preferences,  a  priority  already well  appreciated within  the  industry.  (Hill  et al., 2007) Second, and perhaps more importantly,  it  also  highlights  a  risk.  If  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  for  fuel consumption moves in step with fuel prices – or with their expectation of future fuel prices, based on price trends – then the optimal balance between performance and fuel consumption has the potential to shift much more rapidly than automakers can redesign  their  products.  Automakers  therefore  may  stand  to  benefit  if  they  can shorten the cycle time needed to bring a new product to market, or if they can more easily readjust the balance between performance and fuel consumption in existing products through mid‐cycle changes.  
6.1 Future Work This work has applied a modeling framework based on technology allocation to the problem  of  automotive  performance  and  fuel  consumption.  Unlike  technology 
adoption  modeling  frameworks  commonly  used  to  evaluate  this  system,  the technology allocation framework recognizes the significant inertia in the automotive industry,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  rapidly  increase  or  decrease  the  rate  of technology deployment. Rather than focusing on which technologies can be adopted to  reduce  fuel  consumption,  this  framework  takes  the  introduction  of  more 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advanced technologies as a given, and looks instead at what must be done to direct those  technologies  toward  to  policy  goal  of  lowering  fuel  consumption. While  the model presented in this work provides a useful way of looking at the performance‐fuel  consumption  tradeoff,  there  are  significant  opportunities  to  make  it  more robust, as well as more comprehensive. The model currently does not segment the vehicle market by class, nor consumers by their preferences. The model delivers useful understanding of the general drivers of  the  performance‐fuel  economy  tradeoff,  but  cannot  make  detailed  predictions about market mix. The model could be expanded to include light trucks,  instead of just cars, in order to capture this large and important part of the U.S. vehicle market. In  addition,  cars  and  trucks  could  be  disaggregated  into  segments  in  order  to capture differences in the performance‐fuel economy tradeoff across these classes. Along with a segmenting of the vehicle market, it would make sense to incorporate heterogeneities  in  consumers’  WTP  for  performance  and  fuel  consumption, especially for purchasers in different segments. The model is intended to examine optimal tradeoffs over the medium to long term, meaning periods of ten years or more. It cannot produce meaningful results for, nor be reasonably compared with, trends over shorter time periods. Such periods may be too short to allow for automakers to identify shifts in consumer preferences and public policies, and to adjust their design priorities accordingly. The model would be more  useful  if  it  could  provide  insights  into  the  dynamics  of  fuel  prices,  shifts  in consumers’  willingness  to  pay,  and  the  vehicle  development  and  production process.  This would  allow  it  to  be  used  to  estimate  shorter  term  effects  of  policy changes, as well as longer‐term effects. Many  attributes  beyond  performance  and  technology  influence  the  fuel consumption  of  vehicles,  and  may  be  valued  by  consumers.  For  example,  fuel consumption  is decreased by  increasing size, or adding safety equipment or other accessories  that  increase vehicle weight. The model  could be  expanded  to  include 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Acronyms, Abbreviation, and Symbols 
A 0-60 mph acceleration time seconds 
c Coefficient in acceleration vs power/weight function  
C A constant incorporating consumers' baseline value of performance and 
fuel consumption 
dollars 
CAFE Corporate Average Fuel Economy (standards) mpg 
d Exponent in acceleration vs power/weight function  
ERFC Emphasis on reducing fuel consumption % 
FC Unadjusted 55/45 city/highway combined fuel consumption liters/100km 
FE Unadjusted 55/45 city/highway combined fuel economy mpg 
I Amount of incentive dollars 
k A constant (value = 235.2) used to convert between fuel economy and 
fuel consumption space. k = FE*FC 
mpg-l/100km 
MSRP Manufacturer's suggested retail price dollars 
n Payback period for calculating WTP for fuel consumption years 
P Engine peak horsepower hp 
p Coefficient in performance-fuel consumption tradeoff function  
Pfuel Price of fuel dollars per 
liter 
PSFI Performance-size-fuel economy index (hp/lb)(ft3)(m
pg) 
q Exponent in performance-fuel consumption tradeoff function  
r Incentive rate per unit change in attribute of interest dollars per 
unit attribute 
S Interior Volume (Size) ft3 
vA Willingness to pay per unit reduction in 0-60 mph acceleration time dollars/second 
vFC Willingness to pay per unit reduction in fuel consumption dollars   
l/100km 
ΔVA Consumers' valuation of reduced acceleration time dollars 
ΔVFC Consumers' valuation of fuel consumption reduction dollars 
ΔVtech Consumers' valuation of new efficiency technology dollars 
VKT Vehicle kilometers traveled km 
WI Inertia weight (curb weight + 300 lbs.) pounds 
WTP Willingness to Pay dollars per 
unit of 
attribute 













C. V6 Price Premiums 
Manufactuers’ suggested retail prices for comparably‐equipped 4‐ and 6‐cylinder versions of popular U.S. car models. (American Honda Motor Co., ; Consumer Reports, 2009; Ford Motor Company, ; Ford Motor Company,  ; General Motors Corporation,  ; Hyundai Motor America,  ; Mazda North American Operations, ; Nissan North America, ; Toyota Motor Sales, )  
 Price 0-60 mph Time 
Year, Model & Trim 4-cylinder 6-cylinder 4-cylinder 6-cylinder Performance 
Premium ($/sec) 
2009 Camry LE $22,370 $24,935 9.6 7.1 $1,030 
2009 Camry SE $25,615 $28,290 9.6 7.1 $1,070 
2009 Camry XLE $28,435 $30,505 9.6 7.1 $830 
2009 Accord EX $25,355 $27,275 9.8 7.4 $800 
2009 Accord EX-L $27,355 $29,375 9.8 7.4 $840 
2009 Malibu 2LT $25,375 $27,170 9.4 6.5 $620 
2009 Fusion SE $19,545 $20,829 9.5 8.0 $860 
2009 Fusion SEL $20,668 $21,925 9.5 8.0 $840 
2009 Altima SL $27,220 $30,210 8.1 6.4 $1,760 
2009 Altima SL (2) $29,900 $33,180 8.1 6.4 $1,930 
2009 Sonata GLS $18,595 $21,145 9.8 7.4 $1,060 
2009 Sonata SE $20,745 $22,745 9.8 7.4 $830 
2009 Sonata Limited $23,245 $25,245 9.8 7.4 $830 
2009 Mazda6 Touring $23,520 $26,130 9.0 6.8 $1,190 
2009 Mazda6 Grand Touring $26,780 $29,235 9.0 6.8 $1,120 
2009 Milan $21,340 $22,970 9.5 8.0 $1,090 
2009 Milan Premier $23,385 $24,845 9.5 8.0 $970 
2009 G8 $29,730 $32,440 7.0 5.3 $1,590  
 
